Ordered that the further amended order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Pursuant to statute, the plaintiffs were entitled to interest on the amount of their recovery, both postverdict (CPLR 5002) and following entry of judgment (CPLR 5003). The fact that they took a cross appeal from a different aspect of the judgment did not constitute the type of inequitable conduct which would estop them from claiming interest for the period during which the cross appeals were pending (see, Feldman v. Brodsky, 12 A.D.2d 347, 350-351, affd 11 N.Y.2d 692; Stever v. Associated Transp., 270 App. Div. 956, affd 296 N.Y. 674; Lanni v Spallina, 39 Misc.2d 639). There was no conduct by the plaintiffs during the pendency of the cross appeals which prevented the defendants from satisfying the judgment awarding damages for conscious pain and suffering and, therefore, the plaintiffs should not be barred from recovering interest from the date of the original verdict and from the date of the original judgment (CPLR 5002, 5003; Cooperman v. Ferrentino, 38 A.D.2d 945). Thompson, J.P., Brown, Weinstein and Sullivan, JJ., concur.