Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law and the facts, the determination is confirmed, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, without costs or disbursements.
Initially, we note that the instant petition raises an issue of substantial evidence; hence, the Supreme Court, Kings County, should have transferred the proceeding to this court (see, CPLR 7804 [g]; Matter of O'Brien v. Steisel, 104 A.D.2d 817). However, this court is empowered to treat the issues de novo as if the matter had been properly transferred (see, Johnson v. Ward, 124 A.D.2d 466; Matter of King v. McMickens, 120 A.D.2d 351, affd 69 N.Y.2d 840, rearg denied 69 N.Y.2d 985; Matter of O'Brien v Steisel, supra).
Upon our review of the record, we find that there is substantial evidence to support the determination of the Transit Authority sustaining the charges against the petitioner, nor do we find the penalty imposed to be so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience of the court (see, Matter of Kutchera v. New York City Tr. Auth., 37 N.Y.2d 732; Matter of Waldron v. New York City Tr. Auth., 69 A.D.2d 907; see generally, Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222).
Contrary to the petitioner's present contention, the Transit Authority did not reverse the findings of fact made by the Hearing Officer, but instead sustained those findings and validly exercised its discretion in imposing a penalty greater than that which was originally recommended. Thus, there is no basis upon which to remit the matter for new factual findings (cf., Matter of Becton v. New York City Tr. Auth., 130 A.D.2d 745).
We have considered the petitioner's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Eiber, J.P., Kooper, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.