Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the motion for pendente lite professional fees is denied.
As a general rule, broad financial disclosure should be denied unless and until an existing separation agreement between the parties which controls their respective support obligations and the distribution of property is set aside (see, Weinstock v Weinstock, 122 A.D.2d 790; Potvin v Potvin, 92 A.D.2d 562, 563; see also, McLean v Balkoski, 125 A.D.2d 234, 235). Because the validity of the separation agreement must be determined as a threshold matter prior to granting a broad right of disclosure, the award of professional fees to permit the plaintiff to evaluate the matters subject to financial disclosure was inappropriate.
Were we to consider the plaintiff's motion for professional fees on the merits, we would vacate the pendente lite awards, as there was no basis upon which to determine an appropriate amount of such fees (see, Gastineau v Gastineau, 127 A.D.2d 629, 630; Ahern v Ahern, 94 A.D.2d 53, 58). Thompson, J.P., Bracken, Brown, Weinstein and Spatt, JJ., concur.