Ordered that the order dated April 27, 1987 is affirmed insofar as appealed from, and the appeal from the order dated September 3, 1987 is dismissed, with one bill of costs payable by the estate.
The six-day statutory time period within which the petitioner was entitled to demand a jury trial as a matter of right expired 18 months before she made her demand (see, SCPA 502). The petitioner's misunderstanding of the law and alleged reliance on erroneous legal advice do not warrant the granting of such an untimely demand regardless of the lack of prejudice to the respondent (see, CPLR 2001).
The petitioner's motion for leave to renew, in which she fails to raise additional material facts which were unavailable at the time of the original motion, is actually one to reargue, the denial of which is not appealable (see, Siegel, N Y Prac § 254). Even if the motion were deemed one for renewal, it was properly denied because the petitioner has not offered a reasonable excuse for her failure to produce the additional facts at the time of the original motion (see, Matter of Kadish v Colombo, 121 A.D.2d 722; Caffee v Arnold, 104 A.D.2d 352).
We have examined the remaining contentions advanced by the petitioner and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J.P., Brown, Weinstein and Harwood, JJ., concur.