Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Although this court has adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating default judgments in matrimonial actions (see, D'Alleva v D'Alleva, 127 A.D.2d 732; Antonovich v Antonovich, 84 A.D.2d 799; Hegarty v Hegarty, 48 A.D.2d 891), the opening of a default is discretionary. We agree with the Supreme Court that the defendant was personally served with a summons and complaint and that personal jurisdiction was obtained over him in the divorce action. Furthermore, the defendant did not move to vacate the judgment until almost nine years after its entry and has failed to establish a meritorious defense to the plaintiff wife's allegations of cruel and inhuman treatment. Under the circumstances, we find that the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the divorce judgment (see, Candeloro v Candeloro, 133 A.D.2d 731; Diachuk v Diachuk, 117 A.D.2d 985). Bracken, J.P., Eiber, Kooper and Harwood, JJ., concur.