GARRISON v. GARRISON

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Docket Number

No. 8722SC1247

Attorney(S)

Harris, Pressly Thomas, by Edwin A. Pressly, for plaintiff, appellee. Ronald Williams for defendant, appellant.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner Robert C. Garrison and respondent Ramona Garrison were married on December 22, 1979. On June 15, 1981, they acquired property as tenants by the entirety, which they occupied as their marital home until their separation on July 22, 1985. On July 23, 1986, petitioner filed an action in district court seeking absolute divorce and equitable distribution of marital property. Respondent admitted the essential allegations and joined in the request for divorce and equitable distribution. A judgment of absolute divorce was entered on January 19, 1987, but no judgment regarding equitable distribution was entered at that time. Subsequently, on July 29, 1987, petitioner initiated a special proceeding in superior court seeking partition of the property pursuant to G.S. 46-1 et seq. Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The clerk of superior court dismissed the proceeding, but the superior court judge reversed that dismissal and ordered the partition to proceed. Respondent appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the superior court has authority to partition marital property pursuant to G.S. 46-1 et seq. after the jurisdiction of the district court has been properly invoked for equitable distribution in a divorce proceeding.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
G.S. 7A-244	Establishes that district court has exclusive jurisdiction over divorce, equitable distribution, and related proceedings regardless of amount in controversy.	Confirmed that district court retains jurisdiction over equitable distribution despite failure to enter judgment before special proceeding in superior court.
G.S. 50-11(e)	Provides that the right to equitable distribution is destroyed by absolute divorce unless asserted prior to judgment or within six months after judgment.	Reinforced that parties’ invocation of district court jurisdiction for equitable distribution remains valid and superior court lacks authority to partition marital property thereafter.
G.S. 46-1 et seq.	Governs partition of property owned as tenants in common.	Held not applicable to marital property after invocation of district court jurisdiction for equitable distribution in divorce proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory framework governing jurisdiction over marital property disputes. It emphasized that under G.S. 7A-244, the district court has exclusive jurisdiction over divorce and equitable distribution matters, irrespective of the amount involved. Since the parties had properly invoked the district court's jurisdiction to equitably distribute their marital property during the divorce action, that court retained jurisdiction despite not having entered a judgment on equitable distribution prior to the filing of the special proceeding in superior court. The court further explained that the superior court’s authority to partition property under G.S. 46-1 et seq. applies only to property held as tenants in common and is not available for marital property once the district court’s jurisdiction for equitable distribution has been invoked. The court concluded that the superior court erred in ordering partition of the marital property and thus vacated that order and remanded for dismissal of the special proceeding.

Holding and Implications

The superior court erred in ordering partition of the marital property pursuant to G.S. 46-1 et seq. after the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over equitable distribution in the divorce proceeding.

The court vacated the superior court’s order and remanded the case for entry of an order dismissing the special proceeding. The direct effect is that partition of marital property must proceed exclusively through the district court’s equitable distribution process once jurisdiction is invoked there. No new precedent was established beyond clarifying the limits of superior court jurisdiction in this context.

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ROBERT C. GARRISON v. RAMONA GARRISON

Divorce and Alimony 30; Partition 3.1 — authority of district court invoked for equitable distribution — no authority of superior court to partition marital property The superior court had no authority to partition marital property pursuant to the provisions of N.C.G.S. 46-1 et seq. after divorce of the parties where the jurisdiction of the district court had been properly invoked in the divorce proceeding to equitably distribute such marital property.

This is a special proceeding wherein petitioner seeks to have property allegedly owned as tenants in common partitioned pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 46-1 et seq. The record before us discloses the following uncontroverted facts: Petitioner and respondent were married on 22 December 1979. On 15 June 1981, they were conveyed as tenants by the entirety the property in question, where they lived as husband and wife until they separated on 22 July 1985. On 23 July 1986, petitioner as plaintiff brought an action in district court for absolute divorce and equitable distribution. Respondent as defendant filed an answer admitting the essential allegations in the complaint and joined in the prayer for absolute divorce and equitable distribution of the marital property. On 19 January 1987, a judgment of absolute divorce was entered, but no judgment of equitable distribution was entered. On 29 July 1987, petitioner filed a special proceeding pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 46-1 et seq. in the office of the clerk of superior court. In this special proceeding, petitioner sought partition of the real property that "petitioner and respondent [had] purchased" as tenants by the entirety on 15 June 1981 and "occupied . . . as their home." Respondent filed a motion to dismiss this special proceeding pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter." The clerk of superior court dismissed the special proceeding, and petitioner appealed to the Judge of the superior court who, on 21 October 1987, reversed the decision of the clerk and directed the clerk "to issue an order appointing commissioners and to proceed in an orderly fashion with the partitioning of the property described in the Petition." Respondent appealed to this Court.

HEDRICK, Chief Judge.

The only question before us is whether the superior court erred in ordering the property described in the special proceeding partitioned pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 46-1 et seq. We hold it did err; therefore, we vacate the order of the superior court and remand the proceeding to the superior court for entry of an order dismissing the special proceeding.

G.S. 7A-244 states:

The district court division is the proper division without regard to the amount in controversy, for the trial of civil actions and proceedings for annulment, divorce, equitable distribution of property, alimony, child support, child custody and the enforcement of separation or property settlement agreements between spouses, or recovery for the breach thereof. (Emphasis added.)

G.S. 50-11(e), in pertinent part, provides:

An absolute divorce obtained within this State shall destroy the right of a spouse to an equitable distribution of the marital property under G.S. 50-20 unless the right is asserted prior to judgment of absolute divorce; except, the defendant may bring an action or file a motion in the cause for equitable distribution within six months from the date of the judgment in such a case. . . .

The parties in the present case invoked the jurisdiction of the district court to equitably distribute their marital property in the action for absolute divorce and equitable distribution of their marital property. The district court did not lose jurisdiction to equitably distribute the marital property because of its failure to enter a judgment in the equitable distribution case before the special proceeding seeking partition of the marital property was filed in the office of the clerk of superior court. The superior court has no authority to partition marital property pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 46-1 et seq. where, as here, the jurisdiction of the district court has been properly invoked to equitably distribute such marital property. Had the parties not asserted their right to have the property equitably distributed pursuant to G.S. 50-20, either tenant in common could have filed a special proceeding to have the property partitioned as provided by G.S. 46-1 et seq.

For the reasons set out above, the order of the superior court dated 21 October 1987 is vacated, and the proceeding is remanded to the superior court for the entry of an order dismissing the special proceeding to have the property in question partitioned pursuant to G.S. 46-1 et seq.

Vacated and remanded.

Judges WELLS and COZORT concur.