PER CURIAM.
The bankruptcy court entered judgment for Hogan, the debtor, on December 23, 1986, which was received by Moore's counsel on the following day. Moore's counsel failed to file notice of appeal within the ten-day period provided in Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a). That ten-day period expired on January 2, 1987. Subsequently, on January 23, 1987, counsel filed a motion to extend the time for appeal under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c). The bankruptcy court denied the motion as untimely, because it was filed more than 20 days after the expiration of the ten-day period for filing a notice of appeal — i.e., more than 20 days after January 2, 1987. The District Court affirmed. Moore appeals, contending that (i) the District Court erred in concluding that the motion to extend the time for appeal was not timely filed, and (ii) the circumstances which prevented Moore's counsel from filing the motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal before the expiration of the initial ten-day period for filing a notice of appeal (Rule 8002(a)) constitute "excusable neglect" under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c).
Counsel states that he missed the deadline because (i) he was unable to contact his clients over the Christmas holidays, (ii) he was shorthanded due to the departure of an associate on December 1, 1986, (iii) he was working 12- to 16-hour days in preparation for a trial in mid-January 1987, and (iv) he was unaware of the appeal period.
Bankruptcy Rule 8002. Time for Filing Notice of Appeal.
Bankruptcy Rule 8002. Time for Filing Notice of Appeal.
The District Court correctly concluded that the motion to extend the time for appeal was not timely filed. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) provides that in computing a period of time, the day of the event causing the period of time to begin to run shall not be included in the computation. The first day of the ten-day period for notice of appeal was therefore the day after entry of judgment, namely December 24, 1986. The last day of that ten-day period was January 2, 1987. As simple as the rule itself, the result is simple. January 2, 1987 was the last day of the ten-day period for filing notice of appeal prescribed in Rule 8002(a). January 2 is the day of the default from which the twenty-day time period of Rule 8002(c) began to run — not January 3, 1987, as in Moore's erroneous calculation of time. Rule 9006(a) excludes January 2, 1987 from the twenty-day period provided for in Rule 8002(c). Accordingly, the first day of the twenty-day time period was January 3, and the last day was Thursday, January 22, 1987. The motion to extend had to be filed on or before January 22. Having filed it on January 23, Moore missed the magic time by one day. The motion for extension of time filed on January 23 was therefore untimely. The Rule permits only one period of time in which to seek an extension. It does not permit a second such period. This default simultaneously makes the question of excusable neglect irrelevant and we neither express nor intimate any opinion about it.
Bankruptcy Rule 9006. Time.
At the time this case arose, Rule 9006 further provided "[w]hen the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 7 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation." The amendment which changed "seven days" to "eleven days" did not become effective until August 1, 1987.
AFFIRMED.