Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The hearing court properly determined that the defendant's arrest was supported by probable cause based upon evidence that the complainant gave the defendant's nickname to the detective, and the codefendant, upon his arrest, further identified the defendant by giving the police his phone number, thereby leading the police to him (see, CPL 140.10 [b]; see also, People v Berzups, 49 N.Y.2d 417, 427).
Since the complainant knew the defendant prior to the commission of the offense, any issue of suggestiveness is irrelevant and the showup was merely confirmatory in nature (see, People v. Tas, 51 N.Y.2d 915, 916; People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 552; People v. Johnson, 124 A.D.2d 748, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 713). In any event, an adequate basis also existed for the complainant's in-court identification (see, People v. Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 531-532; People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 411, 417). Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of the testimony of the defendant's brother since it related to a separate incident which was remote and conjectural to the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence (see, Richardson, Evidence § 147 et seq. [Prince 10th ed]; see also, People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 27, cert denied 435 U.S. 998, rearg dismissed 61 N.Y.2d 670). Kunzeman, J.P., Weinstein, Eiber and Spatt, JJ., concur.