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Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • Dennis R. Nettle, P.C. (by John E. Bechill, Jr.), for plaintiffs. James S. Goulding, P.C. (by Joseph F. Lucas), for defendant.
Judges
  • F.D. BALKWILL, J.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • Dennis R. Nettle, P.C. (by John E. Bechill, Jr.), for plaintiffs. James S. Goulding, P.C. (by Joseph F. Lucas), for defendant.
Judges
  • F.D. BALKWILL, J.
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Smart Summary

Knight v Limbert, Docket No. 91979 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1988)

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Edward Knight injured his hip in an automobile accident and was initially admitted to Pontiac General Hospital, where defendant Dr. Limbert diagnosed and treated him for a "posterior fracture — dislocated hip," which required a closed hip reduction and leg traction. Two days after the accident, at the request of Mr. Knight and his wife, Pontiac transferred Mr. Knight to Mt. Clemens General Hospital by ambulance owned and staffed by defendant Fleet Ambulance Corporation. At Mt. Clemens, Mr. Knight was diagnosed with sciatic nerve palsy in addition to the hip injury; prior to the transfer he had exhibited no signs of sciatic nerve palsy. Plaintiffs (Edward Knight and his wife Evelyn Knight) alleged the sciatic nerve palsy resulted from either treatment at Pontiac or from the transfer by Fleet; Mr. Knight alleged that an ambulance attendant put pressure on his leg during the transfer, causing extreme pain, and that he lost consciousness until arrival at Mt. Clemens.

Fleet moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), asserting statutory immunity under MCL 333.20737; MSA 14.15(20737), which, as quoted in the opinion, protects ambulance attendants and ambulance operations from liability for acts or omissions when performing services consistent with training "when the service is performed outside a hospital," except for acts resulting from gross negligence or wilful misconduct. Fleet also moved under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiffs failed to raise facts supporting a negligence claim. The trial court denied Fleet's motions. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by F.D. Balkwill, J., affirmed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether MCL 333.20737; MSA 14.15(20737) grants immunity to ambulance attendants and ambulance operations for ordinary negligence in the circumstances of this case (specifically, whether the statute applies to nonemergency interfacility transfers).
  2. Whether plaintiffs' factual allegations are sufficient to survive a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (i.e., whether plaintiffs raised facts that could support a negligence claim against Fleet).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant Fleet's Arguments

  • Fleet argued it was entitled to statutory immunity under MCL 333.20737; MSA 14.15(20737) because plaintiffs did not allege gross negligence or wilful misconduct.
  • Fleet argued plaintiffs failed to show a breach of duty and causation, and thus summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was appropriate.

Plaintiffs' Allegations

  • Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Knight developed sciatic nerve palsy after the transfer and that the palsy resulted either from prior treatment at Pontiac or from the transfer by Fleet.
  • Plaintiffs alleged that an ambulance attendant put pressure on Mr. Knight's leg during the transfer, causing extreme pain, and they relied on the inference of causation through the theory of res ipsa loquitur.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Wymer v Holmes, 429 Mich. 66; 412 N.W.2d 213 (1987) Give effect to the intent of the Legislature when interpreting a statute. The court cited Wymer as authority for the rule that statutory interpretation must seek and give effect to legislative intent.
Bailey v DAIIE, 143 Mich. App. 223, 225; 371 N.W.2d 917 (1985) Words should be given their ordinary meanings; enforce the statute as written if language is clear and intended meaning is plain. The court applied this principle in construing MCL 333.20737, giving ordinary meanings to statutory language and enforcing the statute as written where clear.
Recorder's Court of Detroit v City of Detroit, 134 Mich. App. 239; 351 N.W.2d 289 (1984) A statute must be interpreted within the limits of its title; the title may be used to limit scope and to resolve ambiguity. The court relied on this rule to limit the scope of § 20737 by reference to its placement and title ("Emergency Medical Services"), concluding the statute applies to emergency care situations.
Williamson v Jones, 125 Mich. App. 433; 336 N.W.2d 489 (1983) Standard for reviewing a MCR 2.116(C)(10) motion: accept as true the nonmoving party's factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences; grant judgment only if claim is so unenforceable that no factual development could justify recovery. The court applied Williamson's standard in concluding plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to survive Fleet's (C)(10) motion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first considered whether MCL 333.20737; MSA 14.15(20737) provides immunity to ambulance attendants and ambulance operations in the circumstances presented. The court noted statutory definitions (MCL 333.20705(3), (4); MSA 14.15(20705)(3), (4)) that characterize Fleet's actions in this case as nonemergency transportation of a nonemergency patient, and observed that whether § 20737 applies to emergency situations, nonemergency situations, or both was a question of first impression for the Court.

Applying rules of statutory construction — including giving effect to legislative intent (Wymer v Holmes), giving words their ordinary meaning and enforcing clear statutory language (Bailey v DAIIE), and interpreting a statute within the limits of its title and using the title to resolve ambiguity (Recorder's Court of Detroit v City of Detroit) — the court concluded that § 20737 applies only to care rendered in emergency situations. The court relied on legislative history and statutory placement: the current statute is in Part 207 of the Public Health Code entitled "Emergency Medical Services" (added by 1981 PA 79), whereas the predecessor statute was part of the Emergency Personnel Act; the change from Emergency Personnel Act to Emergency Medical Services indicated a situational emphasis (emergency services) rather than a profession-based grant of immunity for all duties of ambulance attendants. The court interpreted the statutory title "Emergency Medical Services" as indicating intent to apply immunity to emergency medical services, not to nonemergency medical services.

The court also addressed Fleet's alternative argument under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Citing Williamson v Jones, the court accepted as true plaintiffs' factual allegations and reasonable inferences therefrom. The court concluded plaintiffs adequately alleged a breach of duty (allegation that an attendant put pressure on Mr. Knight's leg causing extreme pain) and alleged causation via res ipsa loquitur (no signs of sciatic nerve palsy at Pontiac; diagnosed after transfer at Mt. Clemens). Given these allegations and inferences, the court found plaintiffs' claim was not so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could justify recovery, and thus the (C)(10) motion was properly denied.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Fleet's motions for summary disposition. Specifically, the court held that MCL 333.20737; MSA 14.15(20737) does not apply to nonemergency situations such as the interfacility transfer in this case, and therefore Fleet is not immune from plaintiffs' ordinary negligence claim. The court also held the trial court did not err in denying summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).

Implications: As applied in this opinion, § 20737's immunity applies to emergency medical services and does not extend to nonemergency transportation situations like the transfer at issue. The direct effect is that Fleet is not immune from ordinary negligence claims arising from nonemergency transfers and plaintiffs' negligence claim may proceed; the court found no basis to grant summary disposition under either MCR 2.116(C)(7) or (C)(10).

Show full summary ...

KNIGHT v LIMBERT

F.D. BALKWILL, J.

Defendant Fleet Ambulance Corporation appeals by leave granted from a circuit court order denying its motion for summary disposition. Fleet moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) claiming that MCL 333.20737; MSA 14.15(20737) granted immunity from ordinary negligence to ambulance companies and their employees. Fleet also moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the ground that plaintiffs failed to raise any facts to support a negligence claim. We affirm.

Plaintiff Edward Knight injured his hip in an automobile accident. Initially, he was admitted to Pontiac General Hospital and treated by defendant Dr. Limbert. Dr. Limbert diagnosed and treated Mr. Knight for a "posterior fracture — dislocated hip." The treatment required a closed hip reduction and leg traction.

Two days after the automobile accident, Pontiac transferred Mr. Knight to Mt. Clemens General Hospital at the request of Mr. Knight and his wife. Mr. Knight was transferred by an ambulance owned and staffed by Fleet. At Mt. Clemens, Mr. Knight was diagnosed as having sciatic nerve palsy in addition to the hip injury. Prior to the transfer, Mr. Knight exhibited no signs of sciatic nerve palsy.

Plaintiffs, McKnight and his wife, Evelyn Knight, alleged that the sciatic nerve palsy resulted from either treatment at Pontiac or being transferred by Fleet. Mr. Knight claims that he experienced pain when an ambulance attendant put pressure on his leg during the transfer. He then either fell asleep or became unconscious and remembered nothing else until arrival at Mt. Clemens.

Fleet moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) claiming statutory immunity because plaintiffs failed to allege gross negligence or wilful misconduct. MCL 333.20737; MSA 14.15(20737) states:

When performing services consistent with the individual's training, acts or omissions of an ambulance attendant . . . do not impose liability on those individuals in the treatment of a patient when the service is performed outside a hospital. Such acts or omissions also do not impose liability on . .. the ambulance operation. . . . All persons named in this section . . . are protected from liability unless the act or omission was the result of gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

The trial court ruled that this particular statute did not apply to nonemergency situations such as the instant transfer. We agree with the trial court's ruling.

The emergency medical services act plainly defines Fleet's actions in the instant case as nonemergency transportation of a nonemergency patient. MCL 333.20705(3), (4); MSA 14.15(20705)(3), (4). Whether or not § 20737, which grants immunity, applies to emergency situations, nonemergency situations, or both is a case of first impression in this Court.

In interpreting any statute we must give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Wymer v Holmes, 429 Mich. 66; 412 N.W.2d 213 (1987). Words should be given their ordinary meanings. As near as possible, the statute must be enforced as written if the language of the statute is clear and the Legislature intended the plainly expressed meaning. Bailey v DAIIE, 143 Mich. App. 223, 225; 371 N.W.2d 917 (1985). Furthermore, a statute must be interpreted within the limits of its title. While the title is not part of the statute, it may be used to limit the scope of the statute, but not expand it. Recorder's Court of Detroit v City of Detroit, 134 Mich. App. 239; 351 N.W.2d 289 (1984). If the body of the statute is ambiguous, a reviewing court may rely on the title to resolve the ambiguity. Id.

Applying these rules of statutory construction, we find that MCL 333.20737; MSA 14.15(20737) applies only to care rendered in emergency situations. The legislative history indicates that the statute is situation oriented rather than profession oriented. The current statute is in Part 207 of the Public Health Code, added by 1981 PA 79, which is entitled "Emergency Medical Services", while its immediate predecessor, MCL 338.1925; MSA 14.528(455), was part of the Emergency Personnel Act, 1976 PA 290. This change of emphasis from emergency personnel to emergency services indicates that the Legislature intended to grant immunity in emergency care situations rather than to all duties of ambulance attendants. As the title "Emergency Medical Services" clearly indicates, the statute was intended to apply to emergency medical services, not nonemergency medical services.

We do not agree that legislative history shows a trend towards broadly granting immunity to ambulance operations except in instances of gross negligence or wilful misconduct. The current statute is indeed broader than its predecessor, MCL 338.1925; MSA 14.528(455), which was repealed in 1978. 1978 PA 368. The predecessor statute clearly indicated that limited immunity was granted only if the life of the patient was in immediate danger. MCL 338.1925; MSA 14.528 (455). The current statute indicates no such limitation. However, while the current statute is more broadly worded, we infer no legislative trend towards broadly granting immunity. Notably, from September 30, 1978, when MCL 338.1925; MSA 14.528(455) was repealed, until July 1, 1981, when MCL 333.20737; MSA 14.15(20737) became effective, the Legislature granted no limited immunity to ambulance attendants.

Accordingly, MCL 333.20737; MSA 14.15(20737) does not apply to nonemergency situations such as that in the instant case. Thus, Fleet is not immune from plaintiffs' ordinary negligence claim. The trial court did not err in refusing to grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).

The trial court also did not err in refusing to grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). In reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court accepts as true all of the nonmoving party's factual allegations as well as any conclusions which reasonably can be drawn therefrom. Williamson v Jones, 125 Mich. App. 433; 336 N.W.2d 489 (1983). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the nonmoving party's claim is so unenforceable that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery. Williamson, supra.

Fleet claims that plaintiffs failed to show a breach of duty of care and causation. However, plaintiffs did show a breach of duty of care by alleging that one of the ambulance attendants put pressure on Mr. Knight's leg, causing extreme pain. Further, plaintiffs allege causation through the legal theory of res ipsa loquitur. At Pontiac, Mr. Knight exhibited no signs of sciatic nerve palsy. After transfer by Fleet, the Mt. Clemens treating physician diagnosed Mr. Knight's sciatic nerve palsy. Accepting these allegations and inferences in plaintiffs' favor, we cannot declare that plaintiffs' claim against Fleet is so clearly unenforceable that as a matter of law no factual development could possibly justify recovery.

Affirmed.

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KNIGHT v. LIMBERT
(Aug 1, 1988)