STATE v. STRINGER

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Docket Number

45839.

Attorney(S)

Sam B. Sibley, Jr., District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant. Martin C. Puetz, for appellee.

Judges

MARSHALL, Chief Justice.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Gary Lewis Stringer was charged with murder and armed robbery committed on March 27, 1986. On September 11, 1987, he was arrested pursuant to a 21-month-old state-court bench warrant issued on December 3, 1985, for two misdemeanor shoplifting charges. During custodial interrogation following this arrest, Stringer confessed and implicated two others who later became co-defendants. Stringer filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his confession on the ground that his arrest was based on an invalid warrant. The trial court granted the motion, finding evidence that Stringer and his father had appeared in court multiple times pursuant to the warrant and that the warrant had been recalled by another judge. The State appealed the suppression ruling. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether an arrest based on a recalled bench warrant, lacking probable cause, renders a subsequent confession inadmissible.
Whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to an arrest made pursuant to a bench warrant that law enforcement knew or should have known had been recalled.
The validity and continuing effect of a bench warrant after the defendant's multiple court appearances and the recall of the warrant by the court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (The State)

The bench warrant remained valid until Stringer's state-court case was concluded, despite his multiple court appearances.
The arresting officer acted in good faith in relying on the bench warrant, invoking the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
Cases such as Maryland v. Garrison and Ledesma v. State support the validity of the arrest under these circumstances.

Appellee's Arguments (Stringer)

The bench warrant was recalled on January 21, 1986, and thus was invalid at the time of arrest.
Stringer and his father had appeared in court multiple times pursuant to the warrant, eliminating its force and effect.
The arrest lacked probable cause, and the confession obtained as a result should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
The arresting officers knew or should have known the warrant was recalled, negating any good-faith defense.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)	Arrest must be supported by probable cause; statements obtained after illegal arrest are subject to exclusion.	Confirmed that arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and mandates suppression of statements.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)	Exclusionary rule applies to statements causally connected to illegal arrest.	Supported suppression of confession linked to illegal arrest.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)	Exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained as a result of illegal police conduct.	Reinforced application of exclusionary rule for statements following illegal arrest.
Kametches v. State, 242 Ga. 721 (1978)	Validity of bench warrants based on routine practice and procedure of solicitor's office.	Supported the court’s recognition of the procedure for recalling bench warrants.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)	Good-faith exception applies when officers reasonably rely on a warrant affidavit.	Distinguished because good-faith exception does not apply when officers know or should know warrant is recalled.
Albo v. State, 477 So.2d 1071 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1985)	Police cannot rely on information known or should be known to be incorrect to justify arrest.	Used to reject good-faith argument and emphasize police responsibility to verify warrant status.
Dean v. State, 466 So.2d 1216 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 1985)	Similar to Albo, regarding knowledge of invalid warrants.	Supported court’s analysis on invalid warrant and police knowledge.
People v. Joseph, 470 N.E.2d 1303 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1984)	Focus on whether officers knew warrant was invalid.	Reinforced the principle that police cannot rely on invalid warrants they knew or should have known were invalid.
People v. Ramirez, 668 P.2d 761 (Cal. 1983)	Negligence or knowledge of invalid warrant imputable to arresting officer.	Supported imputing collective police knowledge to the arresting officer.
United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121 (Nev. 1975)	Similar principle regarding police knowledge and warrant validity.	Supported court’s rejection of good-faith reliance on recalled warrant.
Maryland v. Garrison, ___ U.S. ___ (1987)	Good-faith exception for search warrants with technical errors.	Distinguished as factually dissimilar and not applicable to recalled bench warrant arrest.
Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487 (1983)	Good-faith reliance on warrants.	Found inapplicable due to differences in facts.
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985)	Receipt of bulletin or computer hit insufficient for probable cause if information is inaccurate.	Supported rejection of arrest based solely on outdated warrant information.
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971)	Probable cause required for arrest based on warrants or information.	Supported necessity of verifying warrant validity prior to arrest.
Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982)	Requirement of attenuation between illegal arrest and confession to admit statement.	Noted absence of attenuation in this case, supporting suppression.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by reaffirming the constitutional requirement that arrests must be supported by probable cause, citing Dunaway v. New York and related precedents. The Court found that Stringer's arrest was based on a bench warrant that had been recalled on January 21, 1986, as evidenced by solicitor's office records and consistent with the routine procedures for recalling bench warrants. Stringer's multiple court appearances pursuant to the warrant effectively nullified its force and effect, and no written order was necessary to quash the warrant given the oral orders and administrative practices described.

The State's argument that the warrant remained valid until the underlying case's conclusion was rejected due to the informal procedures of the State Court of Richmond County and lack of evidence supporting continued validity after the recall date.

Regarding the good-faith exception, the Court distinguished this case from those involving search warrants, emphasizing that law enforcement officers either knew or should have known the warrant was recalled. The Court underscored the police department's negligence in failing to verify the warrant's status despite having it in possession for eight days before arresting Stringer. The Court cited cases holding that police cannot justify arrests based on invalid warrants when they have or should have accurate information, as the exclusionary rule aims to deter such misconduct.

Finally, the Court found no evidence of attenuation between the illegal arrest and Stringer's confession, requiring suppression of the statements under the Fourth Amendment.

Holding and Implications

The Court affirmed the trial court's grant of Stringer's motion to suppress his confession.

This decision directly results in the exclusion of the confession obtained following Stringer's arrest on the recalled bench warrant. The ruling reinforces the principle that arrests must be supported by valid warrants and probable cause, and that law enforcement officers cannot rely on outdated or recalled warrants when executing arrests. The Court did not establish new precedent but applied existing constitutional protections and case law to the facts, emphasizing the importance of police diligence and adherence to procedural rules to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights.

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THE STATE v. STRINGER.

MARSHALL, Chief Justice.

The State of Georgia appeals the grant of Gary Lewis Stringer's pre-trial motion to suppress his confession, on the ground of his arrest on an invalid warrant. The murder and armed robbery with which Stringer is charged were committed on March 27, 1986. On September 11, 1987, Stringer was arrested pursuant to a 21-month-old state-court bench warrant (issued on December 3, 1985) for two misdemeanor shoplifting charges. During custodial interrogation, Stringer made a confession which implicated two others who later became co-defendants in the murder and armed-robbery proceedings. The trial court granted Stringer's pre-trial motion to suppress the confession, holding that there was evidence that Stringer and his father had made several court appearances pursuant to the warrant and that the warrant had been recalled by another judge. The state appeals. We affirm.

A valid arrest must be supported by probable cause. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 ( 99 S.C. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824) (1979). An arrest unsupported by probable cause and made solely for the purpose of investigating a crime in the hope that something will turn up as a result of the ensuing investigation, intrudes so severely on the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment that exclusion of the statement is mandated. Dunaway, supra; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 ( 95 S.C. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416) (1975). If there is a causal connection between an illegal arrest and a custodial statement of confession, then the exclusionary rule must be applied to ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment. Dunaway, supra; Brown, supra; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 ( 83 S.C. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441) (1963). The state stipulated that Stringer's arrest was not based upon probable cause but rather mere rumor; therefore, if the bench warrant from the state court was not valid, then his arrest and the resulting statement must be suppressed.

The primary purpose of the bench warrant is to secure the presence of the defendant in court. Once the defendant appears in court, the bench warrant is no longer necessary, and has no force and effect. The bench warrant is simply a means to an end, and in the case at bar, Stringer's appearance several times during 1986 and 1987 eliminated the need for the bench warrant. All the witnesses were in agreement that any future nonappearance by Stringer would have required the issuance of another bench warrant.

The procedure used for recalling Stringer's bench warrant was not different from that of any other bench warrant recalled by the solicitor's office from the Richmond County Sheriff's Department. The evidence of the solicitor's office records clearly showed that the bench warrant had been recalled on January 21, 1986.

In Kametches v. State, 242 Ga. 721 (2) ( 251 S.E.2d 232) (1978), this Court, in deciding the validity of a "bench warrant," based its decision in part upon the routine practice and procedure permitted by the solicitor.

Nor does the bench warrant retain its validity simply because no written order quashing it was entered by Judge Hamrick. As Judge Hamrick testified, the issuance of a bench warrant required an oral order by the sitting judge while the trial court was in session. Preparation of the warrant was handled by the solicitor's office; Judge Hamrick's signature was affixed to the warrant by means of a stamp maintained in the solicitor's office. The "holding up," "dissolution," or "quashing" of a bench warrant was also carried out by the solicitor's office upon the oral approval of the court.

The state contends that the bench warrant continues to be valid until Stringer's state-court case is concluded. However, the State Court of Richmond County simply does not operate as formally as the Superior Court of Richmond County, having a higher caseload and fewer personnel. There was no evidence produced to authorize a finding that Stringer's bench warrant had any validity after January 21, 1986.

The state also seeks to justify Stringer's arrest on the ground that the arresting officer acted in good faith. The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule occurs when an officer makes a judgmental error concerning the existence of facts sufficient to constitute probable cause if the officer has forthrightly set out the facts in an affidavit for a search warrant. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 ( 104 S.C. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677) (1984). However, the issues involved in the suppression of evidence obtained by a search warrant that was subsequently found invalid, are entirely different from those involved in the propriety of arresting someone on a bench warrant which law-enforcement officers knew or should have known had been recalled. Albo v. State, 477 So.2d 1071 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1985); Dean v. State, 466 So.2d 1216 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 1985); People v. Joseph, 470 N.E.2d 1303 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1984). The proper focus of inquiry in this case is whether the Richmond County Sheriff's Department knew or should have known that their information about the bench warrant was incorrect. If the information was incorrect or incomplete and they are at fault, they should not be permitted to rely upon it and justify an arrest based upon it. The primary reason for the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, whether it be negligent or intentional. As was stated in Albo, 477 So.2d at 1076:

[A] contrary holding — which would sanction evidence seized through the arrest of any citizen merely because he has once been legally subject to apprehension — would affirmatively encourage the careless, perhaps deliberately neglectful, failure to delete names from that proscribed list on what would then be the correct theory that the longer the list, the more persons subject to search and the consequent seizure of admissible evidence. Affirmance would therefore actually advance just that impermissible, indeed unconstitutional, conduct the exclusionary rule was expressly adopted to prevent.

In this case, the warrant was 21 months old; such warrants were routinely returned after 24 months; the warrant had not been served during this period although Stringer lived with his father at a known address; and the arresting officer had the warrant in his possession for eight days before executing it, during which time he could, and should, have verified its status from the sheriff's docket book. The documented collective knowledge and negligence of the law-enforcement department must be imputed to the officer executing the bench warrant. People v. Ramirez, 668 P.2d 761 (Cal. 1983); United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121 (Nev. 1975). The state's reliance upon Maryland v. Garrison, ___ U.S. ___ ( 107 S.C. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72) (1987) and Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487 ( 306 S.E.2d 629) (1983), is misplaced, as these cases are factually dissimilar. Mere receipt of a bulletin or "computer hit" does not provide probable cause justifying an arrest if the information in the computer system is inaccurate. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 ( 105 S.C. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604) (1985); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 ( 91 S.C. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306) (1971). Nor has the state introduced any evidence of an attenuation between the illegal arrest and the three statements obtained from Stringer. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 ( 102 S.C. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314) (1982); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, supra.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.