Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, we find that the Trial Judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's motion for his recusal. The question of whether a Judge should recuse himself, to avoid an appearance of impropriety, is a matter left to the personal conscience of the court (see, People v Patrick, 183 N.Y. 52; Poli v Gara, 117 A.D.2d 786; Casterella v Casterella, 65 A.D.2d 614, appeal dismissed 46 N.Y.2d 939). The Trial Judge, in this case, indicated that he harbored no prejudice against the defendant and that he had not reached any preconceived conclusion as to guilt. In addition, the record does not reflect any instance in which the court exhibited any prejudice (see, People v Bartolomeo, 126 A.D.2d 375, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 702). Accordingly, we find no merit to the defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial by reason of the trial court's alleged inability to serve with complete impartiality.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant's challenge to the admissibility of the testimony of a certain prosecution witness was raised and rejected on a prior appeal by the codefendant and we adhere to our conclusion that the trial court did not commit reversible error in this regard (see, People v Faust, 131 A.D.2d 873, lv granted 70 N.Y.2d 954).
Finally, we have examined the defendant's remaining contentions, including his challenge to the propriety of the sentence, and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Eiber, J.P., Kooper, Spatt and Harwood, JJ., concur.