Case Summary: In the Interest of J. A. B. (Court of Appeals of Georgia, Decided October 31, 1988)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant is the mother of a minor child. The juvenile court initially adjudicated the child to be deprived and entered an order placing the child in the custody of the Department of Family and Children Services. Approximately twenty months after that adjudication, the juvenile court terminated the appellant's parental rights. The appellant appealed the termination order to the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the juvenile court's termination of the appellant's parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence as required under OCGA § 15-11-81(b)(4)(A).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant contended that the termination of her parental rights was erroneous because there was an absence of clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court's order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
In re N. F. R., 179 Ga. App. 346, 348 (2) (346 S.E.2d 121) (1986)	The principle that termination of parental rights is a severe measure that must be scrutinized deliberately and exercised cautiously; supports the requirement that termination be based upon clear and convincing evidence.	The court quoted this authority to frame the seriousness of termination and to underscore that the juvenile court's order must meet the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and the statutory elements of OCGA § 15-11-81(b)(4)(A).
Wynn v. Dept. of Human Resources, 149 Ga. App. 559 (254 S.E.2d 883) (1979)	The rule that a previous adjudication that a child is deprived satisfies the evidentiary requirement as to the first statutory finding under OCGA § 15-11-81(b)(4)(A).	The court applied this rule to conclude that the juvenile court's prior adjudication established the first required statutory finding (that the child is a deprived child).
In the Interest of J. L. Y., 184 Ga. App. 254, 255 (1) (361 S.E.2d 246) (1987)	The standard of appellate review for termination: viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, whether any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that parental rights were lost.	The court invoked this standard to review the record and conclude that clear and convincing evidence supported termination.
In the Interest of S. G. T. G., 182 Ga. App. 95 (354 S.E.2d 640) (1987)	Authority cited in support of affirming a termination when the record contains clear and convincing evidence (as invoked by the court).	The court cited this case as additional authority in concluding that the appellant's enumeration was without merit and to support affirmance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by stating the governing statutory framework: termination must be based on clear and convincing evidence satisfying the elements listed in OCGA § 15-11-81(b)(4)(A): (i) the child is deprived; (ii) the lack of proper parental care or control by the parent caused the deprivation; (iii) such cause is likely to continue or will not likely be remedied; and (iv) the continued deprivation will cause or is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child. The court also noted that the juvenile court must consider the best interests of the child under OCGA § 15-11-81(a).

Applying those principles, the court held that the juvenile court's earlier adjudication of deprivation satisfied the first statutory element, relying on Wynn v. Dept. of Human Resources. For the remaining three elements, the court reviewed the record and found clear and convincing evidence that (a) appellant's lack of parental care or control caused the deprivation, (b) the deprivation was likely to continue, and (c) continued deprivation would cause serious harm to the child. The court relied on testimony from case workers and the appellant, together with testimony from a clinical psychologist, and specifically emphasized appellant's unwillingness to accept the facts underlying the earlier deprivation determination. That unwillingness was found both to have caused the deprivation and to render it likely to continue if the child were returned to appellant's care.

On appeal the court applied the cited standard of review—viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that parental rights were lost—and concluded that the juvenile court's termination order was supported by such evidence. The court therefore found the appellant's principal enumeration to be without merit, and it summarily rejected the appellant's remaining enumeration as likewise without merit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Judgment affirmed.

Implications: The juvenile court's termination of the appellant's parental rights stands; the appellate court concluded that the statutory elements required by OCGA § 15-11-81(b)(4)(A) were supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. The opinion does not announce a new legal rule beyond applying existing statutory standards and case law to the facts; its direct effect is the affirmance of the termination order and the final severing of the appellant's parental rights as determined by the juvenile court.

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IN THE INTEREST OF J. A. B.

CARLEY, Judge.

Appellant is the mother of a minor child. The juvenile court adjudicated appellant's child to be deprived, and entered an order placing the child in the custody of the Department of Family and Children Services. Some twenty months later, the juvenile court terminated appellant's parental rights and appellant appeals from that order.

1. Appellant enumerates the termination of her parental rights as erroneous, urging an absence of clear and convincing evidence which would support such an order.

"This court has long recognized that termination of parental rights is a severe measure. [Cit.] `There is no judicial determination which has more drastic significance than that of permanently severing a natural parent-child relationship. It must be scrutinized deliberately and exercised most cautiously. When we do this, we make a decision on human frailties and their consequences. It becomes an agonizing undertaking.' [Cit.]" In re N. F. R., 179 Ga. App. 346, 348 (2) ( 346 S.E.2d 121) (1986). The juvenile court's termination of appellant's parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence which supports the following findings: "(i) The child is a deprived child . . .; (ii) The lack of proper parental care or control by [appellant] is the cause of the child's status as deprived; (iii) Such cause of deprivation is likely to continue or will not likely be remedied; and (iv) The continued deprivation will cause or is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child." OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (A). If clear and convincing evidence of these elements exists, the juvenile court must then have given consideration to the best interests of the child before it ordered the termination of appellant's parental rights. See OCGA § 15-11-81 (a).

The previous order of the juvenile court adjudicating the child to be deprived satisfies the evidentiary requirement as to the first statutory finding. Wynn v. Dept. of Human Resources, 149 Ga. App. 559 ( 254 S.E.2d 883) (1979). With regard to the remaining three elements of OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (A), a review of the record shows the existence of clear and convincing evidence that appellant's lack of parental care or control was the cause of the deprivation, that such deprivation was likely to continue, and that the continued deprivation would cause serious harm to the child. The testimony of the case workers and appellant, especially when viewed in conjunction with the testimony of a clinical psychologist, is clear and convincing evidence of appellant's unwillingness to accept the truth of the facts which underlay the earlier determination of deprivation, which unwillingness was both a cause of the deprivation and a factor which rendered the deprivation likely to continue should the child ever be returned to appellant's home.

"On review of such a decision [terminating parental rights], the standard is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parents' rights to custody have been lost. [Cit.]" In the Interest of J. L. Y., 184 Ga. App. 254, 255 (1) ( 361 S.E.2d 246) (1987). There being clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the juvenile court's termination of appellant's parental rights, this enumeration is without merit. See In the Interest of S. G. T. G., 182 Ga. App. 95 ( 354 S.E.2d 640) (1987).

2. Appellant's remaining enumeration has been considered and found to be without merit.

Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 31, 1988.

IN THE INTEREST OF J. A. B