Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We find that the trial court's preliminary examination of the eight-year-old victim adequately demonstrated that she understood the nature of testifying under oath and was competent to be sworn as a witness (CPL 60.20; see, People v. Nisoff, 36 N.Y.2d 560; People v. Boyd, 122 A.D.2d 273, 275). When asked what it "means to tell a lie", she explained that lying occurs when "you did something and say you didn't do it". In addition, she was able to distinguish right from wrong and understood that she would be "punished" for giving false testimony under oath (cf., People v Smith, 104 A.D.2d 160). She also agreed to tell the truth after swearing on a Bible. Since the witness indicated that she had religious training, attended church every Sunday, and had "learned what it means to tell a lie", she was cognizant of a moral duty to tell the truth and accepted the concept of divine retribution as a consequence of lying. Under the circumstances, we find unpersuasive the defendant's contention that the court was required to determine whether the witness was aware that criminal sanctions could be imposed for testifying falsely (cf., People v. Ranum, 122 A.D.2d 959).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J.P., Bracken, Brown and Sullivan, JJ., concur.