Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contentions, we find that the Family Court did not err in refusing to consider the contents of an uncertified hospital record. The appellant sought to introduce the hospital record of the complainant in an effort to demonstrate that she did not sustain "physical injury", as that term is defined in Penal Law § 10.00 (9). However, Family Court Act § 744 (a) provides that "[o]nly evidence that is competent, material and relevant may be admitted in a fact-finding hearing". CPLR 4518 (c), in turn, requires that hospital records must bear a certification or authentication in order to be admitted as evidence. Because there was a failure to comply with the statutory rules governing the admissibility of proof, the Family Court's ruling with respect to the complainant's hospital records was appropriate (see, O'Connor v. Incorporated Vil. of Port Jefferson, 104 A.D.2d 861; Diamond v. Acker, 78 A.D.2d 546; Nelson v. X-Ray Sys., 46 A.D.2d 995).
Finally we agree with the Family Court that the evidence regarding the complainant's physical injuries was sufficient to sustain a charge of assault in the third degree (see, People v Martino, 112 A.D.2d 1049, lv denied 66 N.Y.2d 616; Matter of Ramon M., 109 A.D.2d 882; People v. Coward, 100 A.D.2d 628). Thompson, J.P., Lawrence, Rubin and Eiber, JJ., concur.