Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
While we agree with the defendant's contention that the testimony given by one of the complaining witnesses at the Wade hearing of the defendant's accomplice constituted Rosario material, we find that the prosecution's failure to turn over a transcript of that testimony at either the defendant's Wade hearing or trial does not warrant reversal. Initially, we note that the relevant portions of the instant case preceded the effective date of CPL 240.44 and therefore were not governed by the provisions of that statute. Moreover, the record demonstrates that the prosecution did not possess a transcript of the testimony at the time the defendant requested its production and the court was entitled to rely upon a representation to that effect by the prosecution (see, People v Poole, 48 N.Y.2d 144; People v Ciola, 136 A.D.2d 557, lv denied 71 N.Y.2d 893). Nor is there any evidence indicating that the prosecution came into possession of the transcript at any time thereafter. Hence, "[h]aving had no immediate access of their own to the statements (contrast, People v Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 64), the People cannot be held responsible for a failure to turn them over to [the] defendant" (People v Fishman, 72 N.Y.2d 884, 886; see, People v Bailey, 135 A.D.2d 643, lv granted 70 N.Y.2d 1003).
We are unable to review the defendant's contention with respect to the propriety of the trial court's Sandoval ruling, as that ruling is not contained in the record before us and the defendant has failed to employ satisfactory alternative means to produce it (see generally, People v Glass, 43 N.Y.2d 283; People v Strong, 137 A.D.2d 733, lv denied 71 N.Y.2d 1034).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Lawrence, J.P., Rubin, Spatt and Sullivan, JJ., concur.