Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We find that the defendant did not satisfy his burden of proving that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. He failed to show a reasonable explanation for the incident, such reason being viewed by the subjective, internal situation in which the defendant found himself (see, People v Moye, 66 N.Y.2d 887; People v Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, cert denied 449 U.S. 842; Penal Law § 125.25), nor did he show that the circumstances were such that he lost control of his ability to exercise the restraint that he should have exercised (see, People v Moye, supra; People v Walker, 64 N.Y.2d 741). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the verdict of guilt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
We also find that the record does not support the defendant's claim of a deprivation of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel's representation was within the broad range of reasonably competent assistance and there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial was affected by any alleged shortcomings of counsel (see, People v Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137; People v Diaz, 131 A.D.2d 775).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief and as to the propriety of his sentence, and find them to be without merit. Kunzeman, J.P., Rubin, Eiber and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.