Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We find that the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in ruling that the prosecutor could inquire as to the defendant's convictions in 1980 and 1984 for burglary in the third degree. Such convictions and the underlying facts thereof were particularly relevant in assessing the defendant's credibility as a witness and his willingness to place his self-interest above that of society (see, People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371; People v Fana, 142 A.D.2d 684).
The defendant was not denied the right to be defended by counsel of his own choosing. On the scheduled trial date, the court was advised that the defendant's family was retaining counsel for him but no specific information or actual retainer statement was provided to the court. Further, although the matter was adjourned to the next day, no retained attorney ever appeared on the defendant's behalf nor were any further requests or objections made by the defendant. We find that the defendant had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to secure counsel and that no exigent circumstances were set forth to indicate that the failure to do so was due to forces beyond his control (cf., People v Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d 264).
Finally, we have examined the defendant's contention that his sentence is excessive and find it to be without merit (see, People v Kazepis, 101 A.D.2d 816; People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Mollen, P.J., Kunzeman, Spatt and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.