Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Although the plaintiffs in both actions challenge the same zoning ordinance, and seek relief on similarly labeled theories, the focus of each action remains the extent to which the ordinance is invalid as applied to a particular plaintiff's property. Further, action No. 1 is ready for trial, while disclosure in action No. 2 is in a preliminary phase. Since action No. 1 and action No. 2 are at markedly different procedural stages and since they concern different parcels of realty with different potential uses and different zoning histories, we cannot say that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion when it denied the motion for a joint trial (see, CPLR 602; see, Shackleford v Mills, 110 A.D.2d 630; Steuerman v Broughton, 123 A.D.2d 681; cf., Mideal Homes Corp. v L C Concrete Work, 90 A.D.2d 789). Lawrence, J.P., Harwood, Balletta and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.