Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the provisions of the order dated September 25, 1986, which granted those branches of the plaintiffs' motion which were for summary judgment on the eighth and ninth causes of action are vacated, and those branches of the plaintiffs' motion are denied.
The defendant has implicitly conceded that it failed to timely disclaim liability with respect to the eighth and ninth causes of action based on the alleged failure of the plaintiffs' assignors to notify it of the accidents underlying the disputed claims for "no-fault" insurance benefits (Insurance Law § 3420 [d]; see, Zappone v Home Ins. Co., 55 N.Y.2d 131, 136). However, the record reveals the existence of issues of fact as to whether insurance policies were issued to the persons referred to in the eighth and ninth causes of action. Inasmuch as the defendant had no duty to disclaim or deny coverage on the ground that there was simply no coverage (see, Zappone v Home Ins. Co., supra, at 139; Irving M. Etkind M.D., P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 124 Misc.2d 779; cf., 11 NYCRR 65.15 [f] [5]), the Supreme Court erred when it granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on the eighth and ninth causes of action. Bracken, J.P., Lawrence, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.