Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of explicit and implicit bolstering testimony. We disagree. First, the defendant's claims of implicit bolstering are unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05; People v Medina, 53 N.Y.2d 951). In any event, we find that the admission of the improper bolstering testimony, while error (see, People v Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471), does not warrant reversal (see, People v St. Pierre, 131 A.D.2d 520, 521). A review of the record indicates that the identification testimony was so strong that there was no issue with respect to the defendant's identity (see, People v Johnson, 57 N.Y.2d 969; People v Mobley, 56 N.Y.2d 584). The eyewitness' identification of the defendant was merely confirmatory since she recognized him from both school and the neighborhood and had been acquainted with him for seven years (see, People v Gilley, 91 A.D.2d 1073). In light of the strong evidence of the defendant's identity and the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, we find that there is no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted him had it not been for the improper bolstering testimony (see, People v Johnson, 57 N.Y.2d 969, supra; People v Mobley, 56 N.Y.2d 584, supra; People v St. Pierre, 131 A.D.2d 520, supra).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Lawrence, J.P., Kunzeman, Rubin and Kooper, JJ., concur.