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Attorney(S)

Jeffrey A. Smith (orally), Cote, Cote, Hamann Smith, Lewiston, for plaintiff. Linda Crawford, Linda Conti (orally), Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.

Judges

WATHEN, Justice.

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: In re Dennis Faucher (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, May 26, 1989)

Citation context: Appeal from the Superior Court (Kennebec County) affirming a District Court order of involuntary commitment to Augusta Mental Health Institute (AMHI). Opinion by Wathen, J.; All concurring.

Factual and Procedural Background

On April 20, 1988, Dennis Faucher (petitioner) was admitted to Augusta Mental Health Institute (AMHI) on an emergency involuntary status. Shortly after admission, a hearing was sought under 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3863(5)(B) regarding continued involuntary commitment. The District Court appointed two licensed clinical psychologists to examine petitioner and required written reports as to whether he was mentally ill and, if so, whether his illness posed a likelihood of serious harm. At that District Court hearing both appointed psychologists testified that petitioner had been diagnosed as a schizophrenic, opined that he was dangerous, and recommended commitment. In addition, the State presented a licensed psychological examiner who testified regarding petitioner's condition and treatment. The District Court (Perry, J.) ordered that petitioner be hospitalized at AMHI for up to eight weeks. Petitioner appealed that order to the Superior Court. Before the Superior Court heard the appeal, petitioner was discharged from AMHI. An Assistant Attorney General, acting on behalf of AMHI, moved in the Superior Court to dismiss the appeal as moot. The Superior Court (Alexander, J.) denied the motion to dismiss without explanation; after a merits hearing the Superior Court (Brody, C.J.) denied the appeal and affirmed the District Court's commitment order. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. The State renewed its mootness contention on appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether petitioner's appeal challenging the District Court's order of involuntary commitment is moot because petitioner was discharged from AMHI before the appeal was heard.
Whether any established exceptions to mootness (collateral consequences, questions of great public interest, or issues likely to recur yet evade review) apply so as to allow adjudication despite the discharge.
Whether the evidentiary issue raised by petitioner — that one examining psychologist's examination was deficient and that the court necessarily relied on that psychologist's testimony in violation of 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864(4) requiring examinations by a licensed physician or licensed clinical psychologist — warrants review despite mootness.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner sought to raise a narrow evidentiary challenge on appeal: he asserted that one of the clinical psychologists' examination was deficient and that the other psychologist's testimony was deficient.
He argued that the District Court necessarily relied upon the testimony of the examining psychologist in violation of 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864(4), which requires that examinations be conducted by either a licensed physician or a licensed clinical psychologist.

State's Arguments

The State argued that the appeal was moot because petitioner had been discharged from AMHI before the appeal was heard, removing the live controversy.
The State moved in the Superior Court, and renewed on appeal, that the Superior Court should dismiss the appeal as moot in light of the discharge.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 578 (Me. 1979)	Articulates the mootness doctrine applied by Maine courts: courts should decline to decide issues that have lost their controversial vitality due to supervening circumstances; the test asks whether sufficient practical effects remain to justify judicial resources. It also identifies three exceptions: (1) collateral consequences, (2) questions of great public interest, and (3) issues likely to recur yet evade review because of fleeting/short-lived nature.	The court applied the Gleason mootness test to the facts of this case, considered the three exceptions, and concluded none applied: there were no significant collateral consequences, no great public interest warranting review, and the particular evidentiary issue was unlikely to recur so as to evade review. Accordingly, the court deemed the appeal moot and directed dismissal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by stating the governing principle that courts should refrain from deciding matters that have lost "controversial vitality" because of supervening events — that is, cases that are moot. It identified the applicable test from State v. Gleason: whether resolving the litigation will have sufficient practical effects to justify use of judicial resources. The court explained the three well-recognized exceptions to mootness derived from Gleason:

Collateral consequences that would flow from a determination of the questions presented.
Questions of great public interest that merit guidance for the bar and the public despite technical mootness.
Issues that are fleeting or of determinate duration, likely to recur in a way that repeatedly evades appellate review.

Applying that framework to this case, the court found:

No evidence in the record of collateral consequences of sufficient significance that would justify continuing the appeal after petitioner's discharge.
No showing that the question presented was of great public interest such that prospective guidance justified an adjudication despite mootness.
Although the court acknowledged that errors in commitment proceedings could sometimes escape review because of short commitments, it concluded that the specific evidentiary issue petitioner raised — alleged deficiencies in the examinations/testimony of the psychologists and reliance in violation of 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864(4) — was unlikely to be repeatedly presented in a manner that would persistently evade appellate review.

Because none of the established exceptions applied, the court concluded the case had lost its controversial vitality and should not be adjudicated. The court therefore held that the Superior Court erred in failing to dismiss the appeal as moot.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment of affirmance and remanded with instructions that the Superior Court enter an order dismissing the action as moot.

Implications:

The direct effect of the decision is procedural: the Superior Court must dismiss the appeal as moot rather than decide the merits of petitioner's evidentiary challenge.
The court declined to reach the evidentiary question raised by petitioner because the circumstances (petitioner’s discharge) removed the live controversy and none of the recognized exceptions to mootness justified review.
No new substantive precedent on the evidentiary issue was established; the opinion applies existing mootness doctrine to the facts and reaffirms the prudential rule of declining to decide moot matters.

Disposition: Judgment of affirmance vacated; remanded to the Superior Court for entry of an order dismissing the action as moot. All concurring.

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In re Dennis FAUCHER.

WATHEN, Justice.

Petitioner Dennis Faucher appeals from an order of the Superior Court (Kennebec County) affirming an order of involuntary commitment to Augusta Mental Health Institute (AMHI) entered in the District Court (Augusta, Perry, J.). Petitioner seeks to raise a very narrow evidentiary issue on appeal. The State argues that because petitioner was discharged from AMHI before the appeal was heard, the Superior Court should have granted the State's motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. We conclude that the matter is moot and that the Superior Court erred in failing to dismiss.

The relevant facts may be briefly summarized as follows: On April 20, 1988, petitioner was admitted to AMHI on emergency involuntary status. He had previously been hospitalized at AMHI on a number of occasions. Shortly after his admission, application was made pursuant to 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3863(5)(B) (1988 Supp. 1988-1989) for a hearing in the District Court regarding continued involuntary commitment. The District Court appointed two licensed clinical psychologists to examine the patient and to make a written report as to whether he was mentally ill and, if so, whether his illness posed a likelihood of serious harm. At the hearing, both psychologists testified that petitioner had been diagnosed as a schizophrenic, opined that he was dangerous, and recommended commitment. In addition, the State presented a licensed psychological examiner who testified with regard to petitioner's condition and treatment. Following the hearing, the District Court ordered that petitioner be hospitalized at AMHI for a period not to exceed eight weeks. Petitioner appealed the District Court's order of involuntary commitment to the Superior Court but petitioner was discharged before the appeal was heard. An Assistant Attorney General, acting on behalf of AMHI, moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds of mootness. The Superior Court ( Alexander, J.) denied the motion without explanation. Following a hearing on the merits, the Superior Court ( Brody, C.J.) denied the appeal and affirmed the District Court's order of commitment. This appeal followed and the State renews its claim of mootness.

We have previously held "that courts should decline to decide issues which by virtue of valid and recognizable supervening circumstances have lost their controversial vitality. Such cases are moot." State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 578 (Me. 1979). The test for determining mootness is "whether there remain sufficient practical effects flowing from the resolution of this litigation to justify the application of limited judicial resources." Id. The application of this test to specific factual circumstances has yielded three well-recognized exceptions to the rule of mootness.

First, the court will determine whether sufficient collateral consequences will result from determination of the questions presented so as to justify relief. Second, while technically moot in the immediate context, questions of great public interest may nevertheless be addressed for the future guidance of the bar and of the public. Third, issues which may be repeatedly presented to the trial court, yet escape review at the appellate level because of their fleeting or determinate nature, may appropriately be decided.

Id. (citations omitted).

The record before us demonstrates no collateral consequences of significance nor any question of great public interest. It is entirely possible that error in a commitment proceeding could escape review because of the brief length of the commitment. It is most unlikely, however, that the specific issue in the present case will be repeatedly presented. Petitioner asserts that the examination conducted by one of the clinical psychologists was deficient and that the testimony of the other was deficient. He argues that the court necessarily relied upon the testimony of the examining psychologist in violation of 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864 (4) which requires that examinations be conducted by either a licensed physician or a licensed clinical psychologist. Even if we assume that his assertions are correct, the repetition of such a scenario is unlikely. Accordingly, there is no reason to deviate from the prudential rule that requires a court to stay its hand when a case loses controversial vitality.

The entry is:

Judgment of affirmance vacated.

Remanded to the Superior Court for the entry of an order dismissing the action as moot.

All concurring.

IN RE FAUCHER