PEOPLE v. McCOY

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

Docket No. 110764.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, L. Brooks Patterson, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert C. Williams, Chief, Appellate Division, and Margaret G. Horenstein, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Lynn Rose, for defendant on appeal.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant Robert Lee McCoy pled guilty to larceny in a building, MCL 750.360; MSA 28.592, and to being an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. He was initially sentenced to not less than 1 1/2 nor more than 4 years in prison; that sentence was vacated and enhanced under the habitual offender statute to not less than 2 nor more than 15 years. Defendant appealed, challenging the scoring of the sentencing information report (SIR) and the timeliness of his motion for resentencing. The Court of Appeals issued a per curiam opinion resolving those issues and affirmed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the sentencing guidelines (as reflected in the SIR) apply to and require resentencing of a defendant whose sentence was enhanced under the habitual offender statute.
Whether defendant's motion for resentencing was timely filed under the applicable rules and statutes and thus preserved SIR misscoring as an issue.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v Sanders, 163 Mich. App. 606, 612; 415 N.W.2d 218 (1987).	Support for the proposition that the sentencing guidelines do not apply to habitual offender sentences.	Used to conclude that the SIR/guidelines did not control the enhanced habitual offender sentence, rendering the SIR-scoring claim without merit.
People v Walker, 428 Mich. 261, 266; 407 N.W.2d 367 (1987).	Defines the procedures required to preserve an SIR misscoring issue: (a) raise at or before sentencing, (b) file a motion within the time period for a motion for new trial, or (c) file a timely motion to remand in the Court of Appeals.	Framed the analytical framework for whether the defendant preserved the SIR issue; the court applied option (b) to evaluate timeliness.
Perin v Peuler (On Reh), 373 Mich. 531, 540-543; 130 N.W.2d 4 (1964).	Authority cited regarding the controlling effect of court rules where conflicts with statutes are implicated (in context of MCR 1.104).	Supported the court's conclusion that a court rule (MCR 7.204(A)(3)(b)) controls when it conflicts with a statute.
Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, 164 Mich. App. 740, 747; 417 N.W.2d 594 (1987).	Illustrates that another panel read Walker to implicate the civil-rule time frame (MCR 2.611(B)).	The court distinguished that reading, explaining civil rules do not govern criminal procedure where a statute or court rule provides otherwise.
People v Holbrook, 60 Mich. App. 628, 634; 231 N.W.2d 469 (1975).	Holds that the time limit in MCL 770.2 (criminal statute) controls over the comparable civil-era rule (GCR 1963, 527.2).	Used to support the proposition that the criminal statute supersedes civil procedural time limits and to justify reliance on the criminal-rule/statute framework for timeliness.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the two principal issues in sequence.

First, regarding the SIR misscoring claim, the court observed that sentencing guidelines do not apply to habitual offender sentences. Because the sentence under review was the enhanced habitual offender sentence, the defendant's claim that the SIR was incorrectly scored and required resentencing was without merit. The court noted that, although it reviewed the guideline recommendation, the trial court did not rely on the guidelines when imposing the habitual offender sentence.

Second, on the timeliness of the resentencing motion, the court applied the preservation rule articulated in People v Walker, which gives three means of preserving an SIR misscoring claim: (a) raise it at or before sentencing, (b) file a motion within the time period for a motion for new trial, or (c) file a timely motion to remand in the Court of Appeals. The defendant had not followed (a) or (c), so the court analyzed whether (b) was satisfied.

The court parsed the time limits: MCL 770.2; MSA 28.1099 provides a general 60-day time limit for motions for new trial after entry of judgment; MCR 7.204(A)(2)(b) (as cited in Walker) refers to the rule time frame, and MCR 7.204(A)(3)(b) specifically provides that when a conviction follows a guilty plea, a motion for resentencing is timely if filed within 56 days after the filing of the sentencing transcript. The defendant filed his motion 79 days after entry of the amended judgment but 49 days after the sentencing transcript was filed. Thus the motion was untimely under the 60-day statute but timely under MCR 7.204(A)(3)(b).

The court resolved the conflict by holding that the court rule controls where there is a direct conflict between a court rule and a statute (citing MCR 1.104 and Perin v Peuler), and therefore the motion was timely. The court also rejected a contrasting interpretation from another panel that would invoke MCR 2.611(B)'s 21-day civil time frame, explaining that subchapter 2.000 governs civil procedure and civil rules do not apply to criminal cases when a statute or court rule prescribes a different procedure (citing MCR 6.001(A)(3) and prior authority). Finally, the court stated that in the context of resentencing motions filed within 56 days of transcript filing, such motions are timely under MCR 7.204(A)(3)(b) regardless of the 60-day statutory period measured from entry of the judgment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The trial court's judgment was affirmed.

Implications:

The court affirmed that sentencing guidelines (as reflected in the SIR) do not apply to habitual offender sentences; therefore the defendant's SIR-scoring claim did not require resentencing of the habitual offender enhancement.
The defendant's motion for resentencing, filed within 56 days after the sentencing transcript was filed (though beyond 60 days after entry of judgment), was held timely under MCR 7.204(A)(3)(b) because the court rule controls where it conflicts with a statute.
Direct effect: the defendant's enhanced habitual offender sentence remains in force and the appellate court affirmed the lower court's judgment. The opinion applies existing rules and authorities; it does not announce a new legal doctrine beyond its application of established precedent and court-rule/statute principles.

Show full summary ...

PEOPLE v McCOY

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Robert Lee McCoy, pled guilty to larceny in a building, MCL 750.360; MSA 28.592, and to being an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. Defendant was sentenced to serve not less than 1 1/2 nor more than 4 years in prison, which sentence was vacated and enhanced pursuant to the habitual offender statute to not less than 2 nor more than 15 years in prison.

Defendant appeals as of right, first claiming that the sentencing information report was incorrectly scored and that he should be resentenced based on a correctly scored SIR. This claim is without merit. The sentencing guidelines do not apply to habitual offender sentences. The sentence from which defendant appeals is that on the habitual offender conviction. Furthermore, although reviewing the recommendation, the guidelines were not relied upon by the trial court in fashioning and imposing the sentence as an habitual offender.

People v Sanders, 163 Mich. App. 606, 612; 415 N.W.2d 218 (1987).

Second, defendant claims that, contrary to the trial court's ruling, his motion for resentencing was timely filed. We agree. In People v Walker, the Supreme Court held that in order to preserve an SIR misscoring issue, the defendant must (a) bring the matter to the trial court's attention at or before sentencing, (b) file a motion within the time period for filing a motion for new trial, or (c) file a timely motion to remand in this Court.

428 Mich. 261, 266; 407 N.W.2d 367 (1987).

In this case, neither procedure (a) nor (c) has been utilized by defendant. Thus, the matter turns on whether procedure (b) was followed. In stating this procedure in Walker, the Supreme Court, by way of footnote, cited MCR 7.204(A)(2)(b) and MCL 770.2; MSA 28.1099. The cited statute states that, generally, a motion for new trial must be filed within sixty days after entry of judgment. The court rule, on the other hand, refers to new trial motions filed within fifty-six days after entry of judgment. Further, while not mentioned in Walker, MCR 7.204(A)(3)(b) specifically provides that, where a conviction is obtained by way of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a motion for resentencing is timely if filed within fifty-six days after the filing of the sentencing transcript.

Defendant's motion for resentencing was filed on May 18, 1988 — seventy-nine days after entry of the amended judgment of sentence and forty-nine days after the transcript of sentencing was filed. Thus, while defendant's motion was not timely under the statute, it was timely under MCR 7.204(A)(3)(b). Where there is a direct conflict between a court rule and a statute, the court rule is to be deemed controlling. Accordingly, defendant's motion for resentencing was timely.

MCR 1.104; and see generally Perin v Peuler (On Reh), 373 Mich. 531, 540-543; 130 N.W.2d 4 (1964).

We note that in Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, another panel of this Court read the Walker reference to a motion for resentencing filed within the time period for a motion for new trial as implicating the time frame of MCR 2.611(B) (twenty-one days after entry of judgment). However, subchapter 2.000 of the court rules governs civil procedure. The rules of civil procedure do not apply to criminal cases where a statute or court rule provides a different procedure. Since MCL 770.2; MSA 28.1099, part of Michigan's Code of Criminal Procedure, sets forth a time limit for new trial motions of sixty days after judgment, it supersedes the civil rule setting forth a twenty-one-day time limit on such motions. Further, in the specific context of motions for resentencing, where a motion is filed within fifty-six days of the filing of the transcript, it is timely under MCR 7.204(A)(3)(b), regardless of whether the motion is filed within sixty days of entry of the judgment of sentence.

164 Mich. App. 740, 747; 417 N.W.2d 594 (1987).

MCR 6.001(A)(3).

People v Holbrook, 60 Mich. App. 628, 634; 231 N.W.2d 469 (1975) (holding that the time limit in MCL 770.2; MSA 28.1099 controls vis-a-vis the time limit in GCR 1963, 527.2 [precursor to MCR 2.611(B)]).

Affirmed.