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Docket Number

No. 77-1566.

Attorney(S)

Arthur D. Serota, Springfield, Mass., with whom Oliver C. Mitchell, Jr., and Serota, Schuckman Katz, Springfield, Mass., were on brief, for appellants. Harold F. Brunault, City Sol., with whom Francis M. Dunn, Asst. City Sol., was on brief, for appellees, City of Holyoke et al. William P. O'Neill, Asst. City Sol., was on brief, for appellees, City of Springfield et al.

Judges

Frank Morey Coffin

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Smart Summary

Rodriguez Diaz v. Stathis, No. 77-1566 (1st Cir. May 22, 1978) — Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Three plaintiffs — Raul R. Ramos, Salvador Torres, and Victoriano Rodriguez Diaz — filed suit in federal court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against electoral officials of Holyoke, Westfield, and Springfield, Massachusetts. They alleged that jury lists for the Hampden County Superior Court were compiled by an unconstitutional selection process that systematically excluded (1) persons with Hispanic surnames, (2) persons not registered to vote, and (3) persons exempt from jury service. At the time of filing, two plaintiffs (Ramos and Torres) had criminal charges pending in Hampden County Superior Court; the third plaintiff (Rodriguez Diaz) was a party in a civil suit in the same state court and had requested a jury trial in that action.

The district court dismissed all three plaintiffs' actions on grounds related to federalism and comity. The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the federal district court erred in dismissing the claims of plaintiffs who were criminal defendants under the doctrine of equitable restraint articulated in Younger v. Harris and Samuels v. Mackell.
Whether and to what extent equitable or comity considerations preclude a federal court from exercising jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief to a private litigant engaged in a parallel state civil proceeding.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

Plaintiffs alleged the jury-selection process in Hampden County systematically excluded persons with Hispanic surnames, persons not registered to vote, and those exempt from jury service, making the jury lists unconstitutional.
Rodriguez Diaz (the civil plaintiff) sought a federal remedy (including declaratory relief) relating to the alleged unconstitutional jury-selection process that would affect his pending state civil action.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of appellees' (defendants') legal arguments in opposition beyond the fact that defendants moved to dismiss and that defense counsel represented on appeal that the district court's dismissal was intended to be without prejudice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)	The doctrine of equitable restraint: federal courts should not exercise jurisdiction in suits for relief that would interfere with pending state criminal proceedings absent allegations of bad faith, harassment, or extraordinary circumstances.	The court applied Younger (and related authorities) to affirm the district court's dismissal of the two plaintiffs who were criminal defendants in state court, concluding Younger barred federal relief in their circumstances.
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971)	Corollary to Younger reinforcing the equitable restraint principle regarding federal interference with state criminal prosecutions.	Used alongside Younger to support affirmance of dismissal for the two criminal-defendant plaintiffs.
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)	Instances where the Younger doctrine of equitable restraint has been applied to certain civil proceedings brought by the state against private individuals.	The court noted Huffman as an example of Younger being extended in select civil contexts, but observed the Supreme Court has not applied Younger in suits brought by private litigants to restrain state civil enforcement.
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)	Another example of Younger-related restraint applied to certain civil proceedings involving state enforcement.	Cited to show scope of Younger-related principles in civil contexts and to distinguish those circumstances from the present suit by a private litigant.
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977)	Further example of the Supreme Court applying principles of equitable restraint in certain civil enforcement contexts.	Cited as part of the line of cases where Younger principles have been applied to civil proceedings brought by the state; used to frame scope but distinguished from the private-plaintiff situation here.
Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc. v. Silva Recio, 520 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1975)	For private litigants involved in state civil proceedings, the appropriate test is an assessment of countervailing interests using "normal equitable principles antedating Younger."	The court relied on Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines as the correct standard to assess whether equitable relief should be granted to a private litigant engaged in a parallel state civil proceeding; the district court's reliance on that standard was noted, but the appellate court found the factual record insufficient to permit the balancing required by that standard.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974)	Principles distinguishing prerequisites for declaratory relief from the stricter irreparable-injury standard required for injunctive relief.	Quoted to show that declaratory relief has different and less demanding prerequisites than injunctive relief; used to critique the district court's focus on injunctive-relief requirements.
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967)	Authority on the scope of declaratory relief and the standards for obtaining it.	Cited to support the proposition that declaratory relief standards differ from those for injunctive relief and should have prompted a different balancing inquiry by the district court.
Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1972)	First Circuit authority on declaratory relief standards relevant to federalism and equitable restraints.	Cited along with the Supreme Court cases to underscore that declaratory relief is governed by different prerequisites and that the district court's analysis should have reflected that.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in distinct parts corresponding to the differing procedural postures of the plaintiffs:

For the two plaintiffs who were criminal defendants in state court, the court applied the doctrine of equitable restraint established in Younger v. Harris and Samuels v. Mackell. The court stated that absent allegations of bad faith, harassment, or extraordinary circumstances, federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction in suits for relief that would interfere with pending state criminal proceedings. On that basis, the court found no difficulty affirming the district court's dismissal as to those two plaintiffs.
For the third plaintiff, Rodriguez Diaz, who was a party to a pending state civil suit and sought declaratory relief, the court recognized more complexity. The Supreme Court has applied Younger-type restraint in certain state civil enforcement contexts (citing Huffman, Juidice, Trainor), but has not done so in suits by private litigants. The district court had therefore relied on the First Circuit's Puerto Rico International Airlines decision, which prescribes an assessment of countervailing interests using ordinary equitable principles (a balancing test) when a private litigant seeks equitable relief affecting a state civil proceeding.
The appellate court found the district court's written analysis to be focused primarily on the higher requirements for injunctive relief (irreparable harm) rather than on the proper, more searching balancing analysis required for declaratory relief. The appellate opinion explains that declaratory relief has different and less demanding prerequisites (citing Steffel, Zwickler, Wulp).
Despite criticizing the district court's limited analysis on declaratory relief, the First Circuit did not reverse because the plaintiffs failed to provide the factual record necessary for any meaningful balancing. Specifically, plaintiff's counsel did not supply information about the nature of the state civil suit, its trial scheduling, or other factors relevant to weighing plaintiff's interests against comity and equitable restraint. The court emphasized that producing such facts was the plaintiff's burden.
The court also noted that plaintiffs had failed to file a memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, and that one of defendants' counsel represented at oral argument that the district court's dismissal was intended to be without prejudice. Taking these facts together, the appellate court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to exercise equitable jurisdiction over Rodriguez Diaz's declaratory-judgment claim.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of all three plaintiffs' suits; the dismissals of the two plaintiffs who were criminal defendants were affirmed, and the dismissal of Rodriguez Diaz's civil claim was affirmed but ordered to be entered without prejudice.

Implications:

The direct effect is that the two plaintiffs who were criminal defendants remain without federal relief on their jury-selection claims because Younger and related authority bar federal intervention in the circumstances alleged.
Rodriguez Diaz's claim (a private litigant in state civil proceedings seeking declaratory relief) was dismissed but the appellate court directed that dismissal be entered without prejudice, permitting him to pursue available remedies in state court or to refile in federal court if appropriate circumstances and a proper factual record exist.
The court emphasized that claims for declaratory relief require a different balancing of interests than claims for injunctive relief; however, the opinion did not establish a new rule of law or broad precedent, but rather applied existing Supreme Court and First Circuit authorities and affirmed on the basis of the inadequacy of the factual record presented by the plaintiffs.

Note: The summary above is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add information not contained therein.

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VICTORIANO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ, RAUL R. RAMOS, AND SALVADOR TORRES, APPELLANTS, v. ANDREW STATHIS, HENRY E. WHEELER, HENRY L. NORMAND AND HOLYOKE BOARD OF REGISTRARS OF VOTERS, THE CITY OF HOLYOKE AND DONALD METZGER AND BEATRICE WELLS AND SPRINGFIELD ELECTION COMMISSION AND THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD AND WESTFIELD BOARD OF REGISTRARS OF VOTERS AND THE CITY OF WESTFIELD, APPELLEES.

COFFIN, Chief Judge.

Three plaintiffs, Raul R. Ramos, Salvador Torres, and Victoriano Rodriguez Diaz, brought an action for injunctive and declaratory relief against electoral officials of Holyoke, Westfield, and Springfield, Massachusetts on the grounds that the jury lists for the Hampden County Superior Court were compiled through an unconstitutional selection process. Specifically they contend that persons with Hispanic surnames, persons not registered to vote, and persons exempt from serving on a jury are all systematically excluded from the jury rolls. Two of the plaintiffs at the time of suit had criminal charges pending against them in the Hampden County Superior Court; the third, Rodriguez Diaz, was a plaintiff in a civil suit docketed in the same court and had requested a jury trial in that action. The district court dismissed the action of all three plaintiffs because of federalism and comity concerns. Plaintiffs appeal that ruling.

We have no difficulty in affirming the district court as to the claims of the two plaintiffs who are also criminal defendants. The doctrine of equitable restraint established by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971), makes it clear that in the absence of allegations of bad faith, harassment, or extraordinary circumstances, a federal court may not exercise jurisdiction in suits for relief that would interfere with pending state criminal proceedings. The right of the third plaintiff, Rodriguez Diaz, to go forward in federal court raises more complicated problems and cannot be so easily decided.

The Supreme Court has in a few select circumstances involving civil suits brought by the state against private individuals applied the Younger doctrine of equitable restraint to civil proceedings. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 97 S.Ct. 1911, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1977). However, it has not done so in a suit by a private litigant. The district court in the present case correctly recognized the inapplicability of Younger to such suits. The court cited our holding in Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc. v. Silva Recio, 520 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1975), that the test for determining whether or not to provide equitable relief to a private litigant involved in a state civil proceeding required "an assessment of the countervailing interests of the parties" based on "normal equitable principles antedating Younger." Id. at 1345.

In applying this standard to the facts alleged in the complaint before it, the district court concluded, "In this case, the Court finds nothing to justify an exercise of its equitable discretion which might impede or embarrass the courts of the Commonwealth. Plaintiffs have alleged no facts which might support a finding that they are threatened with irreparable harm. Moreover, the Court is convinced that plaintiffs' remedies in the trial and appellate courts of Massachusetts are adequate. The Court, therefore, will refuse to exercise its equity jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiff Diaz and dismisses those claims."

Had plaintiffs sought solely injunctive relief, we would find the above analysis entirely appropriate and summarily affirm the district court's opinion. However, plaintiffs' complaint clearly indicated that declaratory relief was also sought. The prerequisites a plaintiff must establish to secure declaratory relief are different and less demanding than the irreparable injury standard for injunctive relief. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466-73, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1973); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967); Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826, 832 (1st Cir. 1972); Note, Developments in the Law — Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 1133, 1291 (1977).

The district court's analysis quoted above seems to focus primarily on the requirements for injunctive relief. In most cases we would find such an approach to be unacceptable. There is nothing in Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc., supra (a case involving a claim for declaratory relief alone) suggesting that equitable and comity considerations against interfering with state civil proceedings necessarily or even routinely should be taken to preclude declaratory relief. A rigorous balancing test is contemplated, including the cost to plaintiffs of having to proceed through the state court system, and some judgment as to how intrusive or disruptive a federal decree is likely to be to the ongoing state civil proceeding. We note that in the present case it might be possible for the district court to decide this case on the merits against defendants and for defendants to change the method of selection of jurors well before there was any need to impanel a jury for plaintiffs' state suit.

Despite the district court's failure to balance interests relating to the declaratory relief requested, we do not reverse. In order for a balancing test to be carried out, there must be a record of facts to balance. Here, plaintiff's counsel did not present the trial court or indeed this court with any information regarding the nature of plaintiff's state suit, the time at which it was set for trial, or any other factors relevant to evaluating plaintiff's interest against that of the state in light of the principles of comity and equitable restraint. This was plaintiff's burden and it was not met. Therefore we have no basis for finding the district court's conclusion that it "finds nothing to justify an exercise of its equitable discretion" to be an abuse of discretion.

Indeed, plaintiffs did not even submit a memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss.

However, given our concern over the minimal balancing test employed by the district court on the issue of declaratory relief, and the fact that one of the defendant's counsel stated at oral argument that the district court's judgment of dismissal was meant to be without prejudice, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiff Rodriguez Diaz' suit but direct the district court to dismiss the case without prejudice. The dismissal of the other plaintiff's suits are affirmed.

DIAZ v. STATHIS