Summary of Opinion: Rangel Hernandez v. The State of Florida, No. 86-977 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 20, 1988; rehearing denied Aug. 23, 1989)

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. Panel: Hubbart, Ferguson, and Associate Judge James C. Downey. Origin: Appeal from Circuit Court of Monroe County, Richard J. Fowler, J. Counsel: Bennett H. Brummer and Bruce A. Rosenthal for appellant; Robert A. Butterworth and Steven T. Scott for appellee.

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant, Rangel Hernandez, appealed from a judgment of conviction and sentence for second-degree murder entered after an adverse jury verdict. The appeal raises a single point: that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting, over objection, certain hearsay testimony from two important prosecution witnesses — Detective Wayne Fleming and Helen Fernandez. The opinion is per curiam and affirms the conviction. Procedurally, the appeal is from the Circuit Court of Monroe County.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in admitting Detective Wayne Fleming's testimony recounting information obtained in interviews with various witnesses (challenged as hearsay), and if any such error was reversible.
Whether the trial court erred in admitting Helen Fernandez's testimony that a third party gave her a gun after an argument between the defendant and the deceased, told her to hide the gun, and explained a reason (challenged as hearsay), and if any such error was reversible.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Johnson v. State, 456 So.2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), rev. denied, 464 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1985)	Cited in the context of admissibility of similar hearsay testimony (the opinion states "but see Johnson").	The court referenced Johnson as a contrasting authority regarding admissibility but expressly "assum[ed] without deciding" the hearsay issue and proceeded to evaluate harmlessness.
Postell v. State, 398 So.2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 411 So.2d 384 (Fla. 1981	Cited as a case involving non-testifying witnesses who were eyewitnesses (used for contrast).	The court distinguished this case from Postell on the ground that, unlike Postell, the non-testifying witnesses here were not eyewitnesses to the crime; the distinction supported finding any hearsay error harmless.
McGriff v. State, 497 So.2d 1296, 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 506 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 1987)	Cited in support of not upsetting a conviction despite technical errors in testimony.	Used as authority to uphold the conviction notwithstanding alleged hearsay or other technical errors in Detective Fleming's testimony.
Allen v. State, 474 So.2d 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1986)	Cited in support of harmless-error/affirmance in presence of technical errors.	Relied upon with other cases to justify affirming despite the challenged testimony from Detective Fleming.
Barnes v. State, 470 So.2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)	Cited in support of the court's approach to harmless-error analysis.	Included among authorities the court cited to decline to overturn the conviction based on technical errors in testimony.
Holmes v. Wainwright, 389 So.2d 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)	Cited as supporting authority in the discussion of harmless-error review.	Referenced in the court's harmless-error discussion supporting affirmance.
State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)	Cited in connection with harmless-error analysis.	The court cited DiGuilio when concluding that admission of Helen Fernandez's hearsay-related testimony was harmless.
Hill v. State, 459 So.2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)	Cited in connection with harmless-error analysis.	Used as supporting authority in concluding the error in admitting the hearsay portion of Fernandez's testimony was harmless.
Priestly v. State, 450 So.2d 289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)	Cited (as a comparison: "cf. Priestly") related to the admissibility/harmlessness discussion.	Referenced by way of comparison in the court's harmless-error analysis for Fernandez's testimony.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in two discrete segments corresponding to the two challenged witnesses.

Detective Wayne Fleming

The detective testified that, following interviews with various witnesses, he began looking for the defendant.
The court stated that it would "assum[e] without deciding" that such testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay, and it noted Johnson v. State in that context as a contrasting authority.
Instead of reversing on that ground, the court conducted a harmless-error assessment. It reasoned that, unlike Postell (and its progeny), the non-testifying witnesses whose statements the detective summarized were not eyewitnesses to the crime here; moreover, it was not clear from the record what incriminating information those witnesses had given to Detective Fleming. The court characterized the detective's testimony as vague.
Given the vague nature of the testimony and "other evidence of guilt" in the record, the court held that any error in admitting Fleming's testimony was entirely harmless and declined to disturb the conviction. To support this approach the court cited multiple cases (McGriff, Allen, Barnes, Holmes).

Helen Fernandez

Fernandez testified that a third party gave her a gun after an argument between the defendant and the deceased shortly before the homicide, told her to hide the gun, and told her why (although the exact reason was never stated in the testimony).
The court acknowledged that this testimony could have contained inadmissible hearsay (specifically the admonition to hide the gun and the third party's statements about why), but concluded that the hearsay portion "added little to the state's case."
Because the alleged hearsay portion was of minimal additional consequence to the State's case, the court found any error in admitting it to be harmless and therefore not reversible. The court cited State v. DiGuilio, Hill v. State, and, by comparison, Priestly v. State in support of this harmless-error conclusion.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The judgment of conviction and sentence for second-degree murder is AFFIRMED.

Implications:

The court rejected the appellant's sole point of error — that admission of the challenged hearsay required reversal — by concluding any such errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in the context of this record.
The direct effect is that the conviction and sentence challenged on appeal remain in place. The opinion does not announce or explicate a new rule of law; rather, it applies established harmless-error principles (as reflected in the authorities it cites) to the facts of this case.

Disposition in the original opinion: "AFFIRMED."

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RANGEL HERNANDEZ, APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the defendant Rangel Hernandez from a judgment of conviction and sentence for second-degree murder which was entered upon an adverse jury verdict. The sole point raised on appeal is that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting in evidence, over objection, certain hearsay testimony of Detective Wayne Fleming and Helen Fernandez, both important state witnesses at trial. We affirm based on the following briefly stated legal analysis.

First, Detective Fleming was allowed to testify that as a result of interviews with various witnesses he began looking for the defendant in the case. Assuming without deciding that this was inadmissible hearsay, but see Johnson v. State, 456 So.2d 529, 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), rev. denied, 464 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1985), we conclude that the error in admitting the testimony was entirely harmless. This is so because, unlike Postell v. State, 398 So.2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 411 So.2d 384 (Fla. 1981) and its progeny, the non-testifying witnesses in this case were not eyewitnesses to the crime charged herein and it is not clear from this record what incriminating information they gave to Detective Fleming. Given the vague nature of this testimony and the other evidence of guilt in this case, we are unwilling to upset this conviction on this and other technical errors complained of in Detective Fleming's testimony. See McGriff v. State, 497 So.2d 1296, 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 506 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 1987); Allen v. State, 474 So.2d 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1986); Barnes v. State, 470 So.2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Holmes v. Wainwright, 389 So.2d 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

Second, Helen Fernandez was allowed to testify that a third party gave her a gun after an argument between the defendant and the deceased shortly before the homicide, told her to hide the gun and told her why (although the exact reason was never stated). Even if inadmissible as hearsay, we decline to reverse the instant conviction based on the admission of this testimony. The admonition to hide the gun, the alleged hearsay portion of this evidence, added little to the state's case; the error in admitting such testimony was therefore entirely harmless, see State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986); Hill v. State, 459 So.2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); cf. Priestly v. State, 450 So.2d 289, 291 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

AFFIRMED.

HERNANDEZ v. STATE