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Docket Number

No. 88-2539.

Attorney(S)

Edward C. Vining, Jr. and Thomas B. Scott, Miami, for appellant. Richard G. Dunberg, South Miami, for appellee.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Albert Ruiz v. Rosanna Ruiz (District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District)

Docket No. 88-2539. Opinion filed July 18, 1989. Rehearing denied September 27, 1989. Appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County (Bernard Jaffe, J.). Per curiam opinion.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a final judgment in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. The husband (appellant) appealed the final judgment and the wife (appellee) cross-appealed; the district court addressed only one point raised by the husband and found the remaining points raised by both parties to be without merit.

The central factual dispute described in the opinion concerns approximately $215,000 worth of jewelry. The jewelry was purchased during the marriage, and it is uncontroverted in the record that marital funds were used to purchase it. The trial court characterized the jewelry as gifts to the wife and excluded them from equitable division. The husband testified the jewelry had been purchased as an investment; the wife testified the jewelry represented gifts from the husband. The trial court found in favor of the wife on the gift issue and awarded the wife all of the jewelry in addition to her otherwise equitable share of marital assets.

The appellate court determined that the trial court's characterization and award were erroneous in part, reversed on that basis, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether jewelry purchased during the marriage with marital funds, but characterized by the trial court as interspousal gifts to the wife, is properly excluded from equitable distribution.
Whether awarding the wife all of the jewelry in addition to her otherwise equitable share of marital assets constituted an inequitable distribution beyond the trial court's discretion.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The husband claimed it was error for the trial court to characterize $215,000 in jewelry purchased with marital assets as "gifts to the wife and therefore not subject to division."
The husband testified that the jewelry had been purchased for investment purposes and thus should be treated as marital property subject to equitable distribution.

Appellee's Arguments

The wife testified that the jewelry represented gifts made by the husband; the trial court accepted that testimony and found the jewelry to be a gift to the wife.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any additional arguments made by the wife on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Burnham v. Burnham, 343 So.2d 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)	Illustration of a case involving a single item (distinguished factually from the instant case).	The court distinguished Burnham on the ground that the Ruiz jewelry was not a single item as in Burnham.
Sihler v. Sihler, 376 So.2d 941 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)	Illustration of a case where the item came from a source outside the marriage (distinguished factually).	The court distinguished Sihler because, unlike that case, the Ruiz jewelry did not come from a source outside the marriage.
Gardner v. Gardner, 452 So.2d 981 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)	Statement that separate property includes assets from inheritance, property owned prior to marriage, and gifts from third parties.	The court cited Gardner for the proposition that separate property may include gifts from third parties, and contrasted that with the present facts where the jewelry was purchased with marital funds.
Marcoux v. Marcoux, 464 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1985)	Authority concerning limits on the trial court's discretion in equitable distribution (cited in support of reversal for inequity).	The court relied on Marcoux as part of the authority indicating that the degree of inequity here could not be viewed as within the trial court's discretion.
Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)	Authority on equitable distribution principles and the proper exercise of judicial discretion in marital asset division.	The court cited Canakaris alongside Marcoux to support the conclusion that the trial court's award resulted in an inequitable distribution beyond proper discretion.
Alexander v. Alexander, 479 So.2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)	Additional authority cited in connection with limits on equitable distribution discretion.	Referenced as further support (see also) for the court's conclusion that the trial court's allocation produced an unacceptable degree of inequity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court's analysis proceeded from a close reading of the record facts and an application of equitable distribution principles expressed in statute and case law as cited in the opinion.

First, the court examined the nature of the challenged asset. It determined that the $215,000 in jewelry was not a single, isolated item (distinguishing Burnham) nor did it originate from a source outside the marriage (distinguishing Sihler). Instead, the jewelry represented property accumulated through an identifiable pattern of conduct: twenty percent of the couple's marital funds were invested in jewelry purchases over a period of years.

Second, the court evaluated the parties' testimonial evidence: the husband testified the purchases were made for investment purposes, while the wife testified the jewelry were gifts from the husband. The trial court accepted the wife's testimony and found the jewelry to be a gift to the wife.

Third, despite the trial court's factual finding of a gift, the appellate court emphasized that it was "uncontroverted" the jewelry had been purchased during the marriage and with marital funds. On that basis the court concluded the jewelry became subject to equitable distribution. The opinion cites section 61.075, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), noting that although that statute was not yet in effect at the time of the final hearing, it is declaratory of existing Florida law stating that "marital assets and liabilities include . . . interspousal gifts during the marriage."

Finally, the court considered the trial court's ultimate disposition: awarding the wife all of the jewelry in addition to otherwise equitable shares of marital assets. The appellate court found that result produced a degree of inequity that could not be viewed as within the trial court's permissible discretion. The opinion cites Marcoux, Canakaris, and Alexander in support of the principle that equitable distribution must be exercised within bounds and that egregious inequities warrant appellate correction.

On this reasoning, the appellate court concluded the trial court erred by excluding the jewelry from the marital estate and by making an award that resulted in undue inequity; accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The district court reversed the trial court's disposition with respect to the jewelry and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Implications:

The appellate court determined that jewelry purchased during the marriage with marital funds constituted assets subject to equitable distribution, notwithstanding the trial court's factual finding that the wife received the items as gifts.
The trial court's award of all of the jewelry to the wife in addition to her otherwise equitable share was held to produce an impermissible degree of inequity and therefore could not stand.
The case was remanded so the trial court can include the jewelry among the appropriate assets for equitable distribution and make any necessary recalculation or reallocations consistent with this opinion.
The opinion did not announce a novel rule of law beyond applying existing statutory declaration and cited precedent; it applied those principles to the facts and corrected what it viewed as an erroneous and inequitable distribution.

Panel: SCHWARTZ, C.J., NESBITT and LEVY, JJ. Attorneys of record: Edward C. Vining, Jr. and Thomas B. Scott for appellant; Richard G. Dunberg for appellee.

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ALBERT RUIZ, APPELLANT, v. ROSANNA RUIZ, APPELLEE.

PER CURIAM.

The husband appeals a final judgment in a dissolution of marriage case. The wife cross-appeals. We address only one point raised by the husband and reverse on that basis. We have considered the remaining points advanced by both parties and find they are without merit.

The husband claims it was error for the trial court to characterize $215,000 in jewelry purchased with marital assets as "gifts to the wife and therefore not subject to division." We agree. The jewelry here under dispute was not a single item such as in Burnham v. Burnham, 343 So.2d 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), nor an item coming from a source outside the marriage as in Sihler v. Sihler, 376 So.2d 941 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Rather, the Ruiz jewelry represents an asset accumulated as a result of a course of conduct whereby twenty per cent of the couple's marital funds were so invested over a period of years. The husband testified that the jewelry was purchased for investment. The wife testified that the jewelry represented gifts made by the husband. The trial court found for the wife on this issue so it is clear the gift was bestowed upon the wife. However, it is uncontroverted that the jewelry was purchased during the marriage and with marital funds. As such, it became subject to equitable distribution. In that regard, we find that section 61.075 Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), although not in effect at the time of the final hearing, is declaratory of existing Florida law wherein it states that "marital assets and liabilities include . . . interspousal gifts during the marriage." See also Gardner v. Gardner, 452 So.2d 981 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (separate property includes assets from inheritance, property owned prior to marriage, and gifts from third parties).

In awarding the wife all of the jewelry in addition to the otherwise equitable share of marital assets, a degree of inequity resulted that cannot be perceived as lying within the trial court's discretion. See Marcoux v. Marcoux, 464 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1985); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); see also Alexander v. Alexander, 479 So.2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). In making its determination as to the equitable distribution of marital assets, the trial court should have included all appropriate assets. For these reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

RUIZ v. RUIZ