ESTATE OF CORLEY v. HARRING

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Docket Number

1396

Attorney(S)

Jean P. Derrick, Lexington, for appellants. Douglas McKay, Columbia, for respondent.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises from administration of the estate of the late Annie Belle Corley. Appellants John R. Corley, Jr. and Drafts Corley (the Corleys) and respondent Janelle C. Roof are three of ten children of Annie Belle Corley. Beulah Harring was appointed administratrix C.T.A. of the estate. The Corleys alleged certain sisters, including Mrs. Roof, owed debts to the estate and specifically asserted Mrs. Roof took $5,000 from a savings account of Annie Belle Corley while she was incompetent; they claimed this sum as an asset of the estate and prayed for a money judgment and satisfaction from Mrs. Roof's share of the estate.

The Corleys filed in circuit court a pleading titled "Notice of Appeal and Petition," which was mailed to Mrs. Roof by certified mail but was not accompanied by a summons. Mrs. Roof filed an answer and counterclaim, raising defenses including lack of standing, lack of personal jurisdiction, and the statute of limitations, and later moved for summary judgment.

The circuit court granted summary judgment for Mrs. Roof, concluding the Corleys lacked standing because they were not the legal representatives of the estate and therefore not real parties in interest. The record on appeal lacked the probate court proceedings, and the circuit judge noted much of the material in the appendix was not before him at the hearing. This appeal followed; the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's result.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Corleys had standing (were real parties in interest) to maintain the action against Janelle Roof seeking recovery of alleged estate assets.
Whether the proceeding in circuit court was an original action or an appeal from the probate court.
If an original action, whether the absence of a filed and served summons defeated the circuit court's jurisdiction and proper commencement of the action under S.C.R. Civ. P. 3(a) and 4.
If an appeal from probate, whether the Corleys complied with the statutory requirements (including filing and service of grounds of appeal under S.C. Code Ann. § 18-5-20) and whether a probate record was provided for appellate review.

Arguments of the Parties

Corleys' Arguments

The pleading was an appeal to the circuit court from the probate court, not an original action; they sought a trial de novo in the circuit court on matters the administratrix allegedly failed to pursue.
They asserted entitlement to a trial de novo (including by jury) in circuit court and contended they were not required to note objections in probate or supply the probate record for de novo review, citing Martin v. Skinner.
They alleged Mrs. Roof took $5,000 from the decedent's savings account while the decedent was incompetent and that amount was an estate asset recoverable from Mrs. Roof.

Mrs. Roof's Arguments

The proceeding in circuit court was an original action filed by the Corleys, not an appeal from probate.
The Corleys lacked standing to sue because they were not legal representatives of the estate and thus were not real parties in interest.
The Corleys failed to serve a summons with their pleadings; no summons was filed or served, so no civil action was properly commenced under S.C.R. Civ. P. 3(a) and 4.
She raised additional defenses (answer and counterclaim) including lack of personal jurisdiction and the statute of limitations, and she moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Montgomery v. Keziah, 277 S.C. 84, 282 S.E.2d 853 (1981)	Supports the requirement that filing and service of the grounds of appeal in accordance with S.C. Code Ann. § 18-5-20 are integral parts of the right of appeal from probate to circuit court.	The Court applied Montgomery to hold the Corleys' filing did not comply with the statutory requirement (their document did not identify grounds of appeal or errors of the probate court), supporting dismissal of the proceeding designated as an appeal.
Martin v. Skinner, 286 S.C. 527, 335 S.E.2d 252 (Ct.App. 1985)	Holds that appeals from probate on the specific issue of "will" or "no will" are to be handled as trials de novo in circuit court; recognizes generally that circuit court jurisdiction in probate matters is strictly appellate and review is on the probate record.	The Court distinguished Martin: it does not support the Corleys because this case does not involve a will contest. The Court relied on Martin's recognition of the general rule that circuit court review of probate matters is appellate and based on the probate court record; because no probate record was provided, the appeal (if so designated) should have been dismissed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment for the following principal reasons, articulated in a stepwise analysis:

The circuit court identified the dispositive issue as whether the Corleys had standing to maintain the lawsuit to recover an alleged asset of the estate. The circuit court concluded they were not real parties in interest because they were not legal representatives of the estate. The appellate record lacked the probate proceedings, and the circuit judge observed that materials in the Corleys' appendix had not been before him at the hearing.
The Court considered two alternative characterizations of the proceedings below:
- If the filing constituted an original action in circuit court, the Court noted the record showed Mrs. Roof was never served with a summons. Under S.C.R. Civ. P. 3(a) and 4(a), (d), a civil action is commenced by filing and service of a summons and complaint, and the summons and complaint must be served together. Because no summons was filed or served, no original action was properly instituted; dismissal by summary judgment was therefore proper on this ground.
- If the filing was intended as an appeal from probate under S.C. Code Ann. § 18-5-10 (the provision was later repealed), the Court found the document failed to identify grounds of appeal or errors of the probate court. The Court invoked Montgomery v. Keziah to emphasize that filing and service of grounds of appeal under § 18-5-20 are integral parts of the appellate right. The absence of required grounds and the probate record meant the appeal should have been dismissed.
The Court addressed the Corleys' reliance on Martin v. Skinner, observing Martin applies to will/no-will contests and recognizes that, generally, circuit court jurisdiction over probate matters is appellate and based on the probate record. Because this dispute did not involve will validity and because no probate record was furnished, Martin did not support the Corleys' contention that they were entitled to de novo trial without providing the record or noting objections in probate.
Having concluded either that the action was not properly commenced as an original action (no summons) or that the appeal did not comply with statutory requirements and lacked the probate record, the Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal/summary judgment. The opinion concludes with affirmation pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 4, Section 8, for reasons appearing in the record.

Holding and Implications

Affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to respondent Janelle C. Roof.

Direct consequences:

The Corleys' action against Mrs. Roof was dismissed/terminated by summary judgment.
The Court identified multiple, alternative bases for the dismissal: lack of standing because the plaintiffs were not legal representatives of the estate (not real parties in interest); failure to properly commence an original civil action because no summons was filed or served; and, if treated as an appeal from probate, failure to comply with statutory requirements for grounds of appeal and failure to provide the probate record for appellate review.

Broader implications: The opinion does not announce or establish a new legal precedent; it applies existing procedural and appellate principles to the record and affirms the trial court's result for the reasons stated.

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The ESTATE OF Annie Belle CORLEY, Deceased. John R. CORLEY, Jr. and DraftsCorley, Appellants v. Beulah HARRING, Indi

Heard Sept. 19, 1989.

Decided Oct. 16, 1989.

CURETON, Judge:

This is an appeal from a circuit court order granting summary judgment to the Respondent, Janelle Roof. The circuit court held the Appellants, John R. and Drafts Corley, lacked standing to maintain their action against Mrs. Roof. We affirm the result reached by the circuit court.

The Corleys and Mrs. Roof are three of the ten children of the late Annie Belle Corley. Another sister, Beulah Harring, was appointed administratrix C.T.A. of the estate of Annie Belle Corley. Sybil Ann Corley and Doris C. Marlow are also children of Annie Belle Corley and sisters of the Corleys, Mrs. Roof, and Mrs. Harring. This dispute grew out of the administration of the estate of Annie Belle Corley. John and Drafts Corley contend their sisters owe certain debts to the estate. The sisters deny these contentions.

The parties disagree about the nature of the case. The Corleys argue the action below was an appeal to the circuit court from an order of the probate court. The Corleys allege the administratrix failed to pursue certain claims of the estate against Sybil Ann Corley, Doris Marlow, and Janelle Roof. They contend they are entitled to a trial de novo of these matters in the circuit court.

Janelle Roof asserts the proceeding in the circuit court was not an appeal from the probate court, but an original action initiated by the Corleys in the circuit court. The pleading filed by the Corleys in the circuit court was designated "Notice of Appeal and Petition." Mrs. Roof received a copy of this document by certified mail. No summons was attached. The Corleys asserted in the pleading that Mrs. Roof took $5,000 from a savings account of Annie Belle Corley while she was incompetent. They claim the money is an asset of the estate. They prayed for a money judgment against Mrs. Roof and requested satisfaction of the judgment from her share of the estate.

This action was taken prior to the effective date of the new Probate Code.

Mrs. Roof filed an answer and counterclaim. She raised numerous defenses including lack of standing to sue, lack of personal jurisdiction, and the statute of limitations. Mrs. Roof subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment asserting several grounds.

In his order on the motion for summary judgment, the circuit court judge held the dispositive issue was whether the Corleys had standing to maintain this lawsuit against Mrs. Roof to recover an alleged asset of the estate of Annie Belle Corley. The court concluded the Corleys were not real parties in interest because they were not the legal representatives of the estate and therefore did not have standing to pursue the action against Mrs. Roof. The record on appeal does not contain the proceedings in the probate court although an Appendix filed by the Corleys contains a letter to the probate judge and his order. The circuit court judge noted in settling the record that none of this material was before him at the hearing.

If the circuit court proceeding is viewed as the institution of an original action in circuit court, then we may affirm the result reached by the circuit court because the record indicates Mrs. Roof was never served with a summons to confer jurisdiction. A civil action in this state is commenced by the filing and service of a summons and complaint. S.C.R. Civ. P. 3(a). The summons and complaint shall be served together on each defendant. S.C.R. Civ. P. 4(a), (d). The Statement of the Case reflects no summons was ever filed or served upon Mrs. Roof. Therefore, no original action was properly instituted and the trial court was correct in dismissing the action by granting summary judgment.

The Corleys contend, however, this is not an original suit commenced in circuit court but it is an appeal to the circuit court from the probate court pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. Section 18-5-10 (1976), repealed by Act No. 539, 1986 S.C. Acts 3446. The document filed in the circuit court sets forth four separate causes of action against Sybil Ann Corley, Doris C. Marlow, Janelle Roof, and Beulah Harring. The prayer for relief seeks money judgments against these individuals. The document does not identify any grounds of appeal or error on the part of the probate court. The filing and service of the grounds of appeal in accordance with Section 18-5-20 are integral parts of the right of appeal from the probate court to the circuit court. Montgomery v. Keziah, 277 S.C. 84, 282 S.E.2d 853 (1981). The document filed by the Corleys does not comply with this requirement. The dismissal by the circuit court is affirmed on this ground.

At oral argument the Corleys relied upon Martin v. Skinner, 286 S.C. 527, 335 S.E.2d 252 (Ct.App. 1985), to support their contention that they are entitled to a trial de novo by jury in the circuit court. As we understand their argument, they were not required to note their objections to the probate court's order or provide a record of the proceedings of the probate court to the circuit court because they are entitled to de novo review in the circuit court and not just a review of the record made in the probate court. Assuming this to be an appeal from the probate court, we do not find Martin v. Skinner supportive of their position. The Martin case holds an appeal from a decision of the probate court on the issue of "will" or "no will" is to be handled as a trial de novo of the factual issues in the circuit court. This case does not involve a determination of the validity of a will. The Martin case recognizes the general rule that jurisdiction of the circuit court in matters coming from the probate court is strictly appellate and review is taken on the record made in the probate court. No record of the probate proceedings was provided the circuit court to review. Accordingly, the proceeding if so designated an appeal should have been dismissed.

The result reached by the circuit court is affirmed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 4, Section 8, for reasons appearing in the record.

Affirmed.

SHAW and BELL, JJ., concur.