Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contentions the court did not err by failing to charge the jury that two of the People's witnesses were accomplices as a matter of law. The two witnesses in question were admittedly part of the group that planned the instant robbery; however, they either voluntarily left the band or were excluded when the plans escalated to include kidnapping and ultimately murder. Their preparatory conduct gave rise only to a question of fact as to their accomplice status which the court correctly left for the jury's determination (see, People v Vataj, 69 N.Y.2d 985; People v Dorler, 53 N.Y.2d 831; People v Basch, 36 N.Y.2d 154). Moreover, even assuming that these two witnesses were found to have been accomplices by the jury, their testimony was adequately corroborated by the testimony of a third witness to whom the defendant made inculpating admissions (see, People v Sargente, 133 A.D.2d 862). Clearly this corroborative evidence fairly and reasonably tended to connect the defendant with the commission of the instant crimes (see, People v Moses, 63 N.Y.2d 299; People v Hudson, 51 N.Y.2d 233, 238).
Furthermore, the court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that they had to find the defendant's guilt to a moral certainty. While there was significant circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt, his admissible inculpatory statements constituted direct evidence of his guilt (People v Rumble, 45 N.Y.2d 879; People v Bolino, 146 A.D.2d 790), thus obviating the need for a circumstantial evidence charge (see, People v Barnes, 50 N.Y.2d 375; People v Banks, 144 A.D.2d 370).
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review (CPL 470.05) or without merit. Mangano, J.P., Thompson, Eiber and Balletta, JJ., concur.