Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked standing. The distance of the petitioner's premises from the proposed Wallkill Town Center project creates no inference of injury in fact (see, Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v Board of Zoning Appeals, 69 N.Y.2d 406, 414; Matter of Kucinski v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 148 A.D.2d 612). Absent this inference, the petition does not allege any special injury, other than that of increased competition, which the petitioner would suffer over and above that of the general community. Inasmuch as protection from increased competition is not one of the interests protected by Environmental Conservation Law article 8, the proceeding was properly dismissed (see, Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v Board of Zoning Appeals, supra; Matter of Dairylea Coop. v Walkley, 38 N.Y.2d 6, 9; Matter of Kucinski v Zoning Board of Appeals, supra; Matter of Har Enters. v Town of Brookhaven, 145 A.D.2d 562, lv granted 74 N.Y.2d 601).
There is also no special injury alleged with respect to the construction of the .57-mile-long Schutt Road extension which can be considered as being different in kind and degree from the general community. Indeed, we note that the improvement of roadways is normally of benefit to commercial interests such as the petitioner and the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved thereby. Accordingly, this challenge also fails for lack of standing. Thompson, J.P., Brown, Kunzeman and Rubin, JJ., concur.