HENDRIX v. LYNAUGH

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Docket Number

No. 88-1960. Summary Calendar.

Attorney(S)

Bruce Robert Hendrix, Dallas, Tex., pro se. C. Rex Hall, Jr., Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.

Judges

Jerry Edwin Smith

Acts

Judiciary And Judicial Procedure — Habeas Corpus — Particular Proceedings — State Custody; Remedies In Federal Courts

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Bruce Robert Hendrix was convicted in 1972 by a state court for possession of a narcotic drug and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. He later pleaded guilty in 1982 to burglary of a habitation and received a thirty-five year sentence. Hendrix fully discharged the 1972 sentence before the burglary conviction and the earlier conviction was not used to enhance the later sentence. In 1987, Hendrix filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, attacking only his 1972 conviction. A magistrate recommended dismissal of the petition with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that Hendrix was not "in custody" under the 1972 conviction. The district court adopted this recommendation and dismissed the petition. Hendrix appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Hendrix was "in custody" under his 1972 conviction for the purposes of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 at the time he filed his habeas petition.
Whether collateral consequences of a fully expired conviction, such as effects on prison classification, parole opportunities, and sentence enhancements, suffice to establish "in custody" status under § 2254.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-Appellant's Arguments

Hendrix contended he was "in custody" under the 1972 conviction because it could be used to impeach future testimony, enhance future sentences, and affect his criminal history record.
He further argued that the 1972 conviction adversely influenced his prison classification, opportunities to earn "good time," chances of parole, and the nature of the prison unit where he was housed.
He relied on Fifth Circuit precedent in Young v. Lynaugh, which allowed jurisdiction to determine if credit would be given on a current sentence for a prior conviction.

Respondent-Appellee's Arguments

The respondent maintained that Hendrix was not "in custody" under the 1972 conviction because his sentence had fully expired before the petition was filed.
They argued that collateral consequences of a fully expired conviction are insufficient to establish jurisdiction under § 2254, relying on recent Supreme Court precedent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Maleng v. Cook, 109 S.Ct. 1923 (1989)	Establishes that a petitioner must be "in custody" under the conviction or sentence being attacked at the time of filing to have jurisdiction under § 2254; collateral consequences alone are insufficient if the sentence has fully expired.	The court relied on Maleng to conclude Hendrix was not "in custody" because his 1972 sentence had fully expired when he filed his petition, and collateral consequences do not satisfy § 2254 custody requirements.
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968)	Supports the principle that once a sentence has fully expired, collateral consequences do not constitute "in custody" status for habeas purposes.	The court cited Carafas to reinforce that Hendrix's expired sentence precludes "in custody" status despite collateral consequences.
Young v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied	Permits jurisdiction to determine whether credit on a current sentence would be granted for a prior conviction, even if no earlier release is demonstrated.	The court acknowledged Young but found it no longer viable after Maleng, thus not affording jurisdiction in Hendrix's case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reaffirming that federal district courts lack jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 unless the petitioner is "in custody" under the conviction or sentence challenged at the time the petition is filed. Hendrix's arguments that the 1972 conviction could be used to impeach testimony, enhance future sentences, or affect his criminal record were deemed collateral consequences unrelated to his present incarceration and thus insufficient to establish custody.

Hendrix’s reliance on the Young test, which allowed jurisdiction to determine if credit would be given on a current sentence for a prior conviction, was considered but ultimately rejected in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Maleng v. Cook. The court emphasized that Maleng clarified that a petitioner is not "in custody" under a conviction if the sentence has fully expired, even if collateral consequences exist.

Since Hendrix's 1972 sentence had fully expired before filing his petition, and the alleged adverse effects on his prison classification and parole were collateral consequences, the court found no jurisdiction under § 2254. The court thus affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the petition.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court AFFIRMED the dismissal of Hendrix’s habeas corpus petition on the basis that he was not "in custody" under his 1972 conviction when he filed the petition, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

IMPLICATIONS: The direct effect of this decision is that Hendrix’s collateral attack on his expired 1972 conviction is barred for lack of jurisdiction. The court reaffirmed that collateral consequences of a fully expired sentence do not satisfy the "in custody" requirement, thereby limiting the scope of federal habeas corpus review to cases where the petitioner remains subject to the challenged conviction’s custody or sentence. No new precedent beyond applying existing Supreme Court rulings was established.

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BRUCE ROBERT HENDRIX, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, v. JAMES A. LYNAUGH, DIRECTOR TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

The petitioner brings a habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, mounting a collateral attack on a 1972 state conviction. Concluding that under recent Supreme Court precedent he was not "in custody" for purposes of the statute, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the petition.

In 1972 a state court convicted Bruce Hendrix for possession of a narcotic drug and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment.

In 1982 Hendrix pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation and was sentenced to thirty-five years' imprisonment. Hendrix concedes that he had fully discharged his sentence for the drug offense before he was convicted on the burglary charge and that the drug offense was not used to enhance the latter sentence.

In 1987 Hendrix filed a petition in federal district court under section 2254, attacking only his conviction. A magistrate recommended dismissing the petition with prejudice, reasoning that the court lacks jurisdiction because Hendrix is not "in custody," within the meaning of section 2254, in regard to his 1972 conviction. The district court, after an independent review, accepted the magistrate's findings and recommendation.

II.

Federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain section 2254 actions if, at the time the petition is filed, the petitioner is not "in custody" under the conviction or sentence which the petition attacks. Maleng v. Cook, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 1925, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989). See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 1559, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968). Hendrix argues that he was "in custody" under the 1972 conviction when the present petition was filed because that conviction could be used to impeach any future testimony he may give, it may enhance any subsequent sentence he may receive, and without it he may have a "clean" criminal history record. However, none of these arguments relates to Hendrix's present incarceration, so they do not show that he is "in custody" for the 1972 conviction. See Maleng, 109 S.Ct. at 1925-26.

But Hendrix asserts that he is "in custody" under the 1972 conviction because the fact of that conviction adversely influences his classification in prison, his opportunity to earn "good time," his chance of receiving parole, and the nature of the prison unit in which he is housed. Hendrix cites Young v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1133, 1137 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986, 108 S.Ct. 503, 98 L.Ed.2d 501 (1987) and 108 S.Ct. 1040 (1988), in support of his petition. Young provides that "when a petitioner alleges credit [in some degree on the sentence he is currently serving], the court has jurisdiction over the petition to determine whether credit would be provided, even if the petitioner has cited to no authority or law that would demonstrate an earlier release." Id. (emphasis in original). This test, if applicable, suggests that the district court had jurisdiction to determine whether Hendrix would receive credit in the form of additional "good time" or an earlier parole.

We conclude, however, that the Young test is no longer viable in light of Maleng. There, the Court acknowledged that a prisoner need not be physically confined to be "in custody" for the purposes of § 2254 but noted that the Court has

never held, however, that a habeas petitioner may be `in custody' under a conviction when the sentence imposed for that conviction has fully expired at the time his petition is filed. Indeed, [the Court's] decision in Carafas ... strongly implies the contrary.... [O]nce the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual `in custody' for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it.

109 S.Ct. at 1925-26 (emphasis in original). Thus, Maleng leads us to the conclusion that, since Hendrix's sentence for the 1972 conviction had completely expired when he filed the present petition, he was not "in custody" under that conviction for purposes of section 2254. Moreover, a conclusion that Hendrix is not "in custody" follows a fortiori from Maleng. Enhancement is a collateral consequence insufficient to render the petitioner "in custody" under the previous conviction. See Maleng, id. 109 S.Ct. at 1926.

Hendrix's arguments concerning the remaining consequences of his classification, including the nature of where he is housed, are less significant than the length of his incarceration. In the light of Maleng, all of the adverse effects alleged by Hendrix are collateral consequences only. Accordingly, he has not shown that he is "in custody" under the 1972 conviction.

AFFIRMED.