Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
It is axiomatic that a probationary employee may be discharged without a reason and without a hearing (see, Matter of York v McGuire, 63 N.Y.2d 760). The courts will intervene only where it is shown that the discharge was made in bad faith, and therefore was arbitrary and capricious, or was due to constitutionally impermissible reasons, or was prohibited by statute or case law (see, Matter of Talamo v Murphy, 38 N.Y.2d 637). The burden of proof is on the employee (see, Matter of Bergamini v Manhattan Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 62 N.Y.2d 897), and the "mere belief of bad faith" (D'Aiuto v Department of Water Resources, 51 A.D.2d 700, 701) or conclusory allegations will not suffice (see, Matter of Mazur v Ryan, 98 A.D.2d 974).
Measured against these standards, the petition herein was clearly insufficient. The petitioner conceded that he was never given a reason for the discharge, and his speculation as to what the reasons might be remained only that — mere speculation. Similarly, since no reason for the discharge was given and none was publicly disseminated, the petitioner was not entitled to a name-clearing hearing (see, Matter of Lentlie v Egan, 61 N.Y.2d 874). Mangano, J.P., Lawrence, Kooper and Balletta, JJ., concur.