Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the inculpatory statement he made to the police was involuntary and therefore should have been suppressed by the hearing court. We disagree. The record fails entirely to support the defendant's contention that the detectives who arrested him proceeded to question him for 45 minutes before reading him his rights. Furthermore, the tactics employed by one of the detectives, which consisted primarily of leading the defendant to believe that the detective knew more about the crime than he actually did, were not so fundamentally unfair as to deny the defendant due process of law (see, People v Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1). Nor was the statement elicited by any threats or the promise of immunity (see, People v Boone, 22 N.Y.2d 476).
The defendant's contention that the trial court should have given an accomplice charge sua sponte is likewise without merit. In order for a witness to be deemed an accomplice as a matter of law, it must be established that based on the evidence presented, the jury could reach no other conclusion than that the witness participated in (1) an offense charged or (2) an offense based on the same or some of the facts which constitute an offense charged (see, People v Tusa, 137 A.D.2d 151). The evidence adduced at trial was in this respect lacking.
Nor did the trial court err in allowing one of the People's witnesses to testify that several hours prior to the murder, the defendant, while attending a party, had pointed a gun at another partygoer. This testimony was probative of the defendant's guilt of criminal possession of a weapon, a crime with which he was charged (cf., People v Baez, 103 A.D.2d 746; People v Philpot, 50 A.D.2d 822), and therefore was properly admitted.
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Mangano, J.P., Thompson, Eiber and Balletta, JJ., concur.