Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, a temporary restraining order dated December 21, 1987, which was obtained ex parte and barred a public hearing of the Planning Board of the Village of Scarsdale, did not constitute the "law of the case", binding a court of coordinate jurisdiction from subsequently reviewing the merits of the issues involved (see, Preston Corp. v Fabrication Enters., 68 N.Y.2d 397, 402; Walker Mem. Baptist Church v Saunders, 285 N.Y. 462, 474; Papa Gino's v Plaza at Latham Assocs., 135 A.D.2d 74, 77; 7A Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶¶ 6301.05, 6301.12; 1 Carmody-Wait 2d, N Y Prac §§ 2:68, 2:69). It is apparent then, that, in considering the parties' motions for summary judgment in the instant action, the Supreme Court was not bound by any determination made in connection with the prior temporary restraining order. The Supreme Court properly considered both the propriety of that order (see, CPLR 6313 [a]; cf., Pospisil v Anderson, 140 A.D.2d 317; DiFate v Scher, 45 A.D.2d 1002), and the plaintiffs' conduct in obtaining it.
We have reviewed the plaintiffs' remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Brown, J.P., Rubin, Kooper and Harwood, JJ., concur.