Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant and the complainant were married for approximately five years. The marriage was fraught with controversy. The instant conviction stems from an incident which occurred after the defendant and the complainant were divorced, in which the complainant alleged that the defendant assaulted and raped her repeatedly. On this appeal, the defendant contends that the court's ruling which permitted the prosecutor to elicit evidence of past attacks by the defendant on the complainant deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree.
"It is elementary that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal or immoral conduct is inadmissible if it cannot logically be linked to some specific material issue in the case (see, e.g., People v Lewis, 69 N.Y.2d 321, 325; People v Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 359; People v Santarelli, 49 N.Y.2d 241; People v Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 46-47)" (People v Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 54-55). Here the People established a logical link between evidence of the past assaults by the defendant on the complainant and the material issues of forcible compulsion and lack of consent (see, People v Velasquez, 141 A.D.2d 882; People v DeLeon, 135 A.D.2d 555). This showing having been made, the trial court then properly weighed the probative value of this evidence against its potential prejudice (see, People v Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233). In finding that the probative value of that evidence outweighed its potentially prejudicial effect, and thus permitting the People to elicit this evidence, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion (see, People v Hudy, supra, at 55).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit (see, People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Brown, J.P., Lawrence, Eiber and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.