After a full hearing before a Judicial Hearing Officer wherein the defendant wife was found to be earning approximately $12,000 per year, and the plaintiff husband approximately $60,000 per year, the defendant moved for an award of $10,500 counsel fees to defend plaintiff's appeal from those portions of the judgment of divorce dealing with visitation and an award of moving costs, rent, and a portion of plaintiff's pension. The trial fully satisfied the general requirement that counsel fees should be based upon testimonial and other evidence of the financial condition of the parties (see, Olsan v. Olsan, 100 A.D.2d 776; Entwistle v. Entwistle, 92 A.D.2d 879).
No further hearing was necessary as to the reasonable value of defendant's counsel's prospective services on the appeal, as the IAS court "is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and * * * make an appraisal of such services, and determine the reasonable value thereof" (McAvoy v. Harron, 26 A.D.2d 452, 454, affd 21 N.Y.2d 821).
We have examined the briefs, and find no basis to conclude that the award of $5,000 in counsel fees to the defendant constituted an abuse of discretion.
Concur — Ross, J.P., Carro, Asch and Rubin, JJ.