RANDALL v. JENNINGS

Citation Codes

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Docket Number

No. A14-89-00664-CV.

Attorney(S)

Jerome K. Wade, Houston, for appellant. Alvis O.L. Rogers, Houston, for appellee.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

After divorcing in 1977, Dorothy and Willie Randall continued living together and represented themselves as married. In 1984, Willie Randall transferred several thousand dollars to C.B. Jennings without documented purpose. Jennings purchased a commercial truck with the initials "W.R." and "C.B." on its door and operated it for hire, sometimes assisted by Willie Randall. They opened a joint checking account, and Jennings paid Willie approximately $150 weekly when work was available. Willie Randall died in 1986. Dorothy Randall, as administrator of his estate, sued Jennings seeking a final accounting of an alleged trucking partnership formed between Jennings and Willie Randall. The trial court rendered a take nothing judgment in favor of Jennings on June 5, 1989. Dorothy Randall timely requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court did not file. She then perfected this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred by failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law after appellant’s timely requests.
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the judgment in favor of appellee.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Joseph v. Joseph, 731 S.W.2d 597 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ)	Presumption of harm when trial court fails to file findings of fact and conclusions of law after proper request; burden on appellant to show no harm.	The court applied this presumption to find harm to appellant from the trial court’s failure to file findings and conclusions, supporting reversal and remand.
Barnes v. Coffman, 753 S.W.2d 823 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied)	Supporting authority for the presumption of harm in failure to file findings and conclusions.	Reinforced the application of the presumption of harm in this case.
Eye Site, Inc. v. Blackburn, 750 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied)	Supporting authority for the presumption of harm in failure to file findings and conclusions.	Reinforced the application of the presumption of harm in this case.
Barfield v. Emery, 107 Tex. 306, 177 S.W. 952 (1915)	Harm presumption may be overcome if record affirmatively shows no injury to appellant.	The court noted this standard but found it inapplicable due to disputed facts and multiple possible grounds.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court focused on the trial court’s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law despite appellant’s timely requests. Under established Texas precedent, such failure gives rise to a presumption of harm to the appellant, which can only be rebutted if the record clearly shows no injury. In this case, the record contained disputed facts regarding the existence of a partnership and appellant’s standing, making it impossible to determine the trial court’s reasoning from the judgment alone. This uncertainty imposed an undue burden on appellant in presenting her appeal, thus the presumption of harm could not be overcome. The court declined intermediate approaches like abatement and adhered to the established procedure of reversing and remanding for a new trial on the merits. Because the first point of error was sustained, the court found it unnecessary to address the second point concerning evidentiary sufficiency.

Holding and Implications

The trial court's judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial on the merits.

This decision directly affects the parties by vacating the take nothing judgment and requires the trial court to conduct a new trial with proper findings of fact and conclusions of law. The opinion does not establish new precedent but follows long-standing Texas appellate procedure for handling failure to file requested findings and conclusions.

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Dorothy RANDALL, Appellant, v. C.B. JENNINGS, Appellee.

OPINION

J. CURTISS BROWN, Chief Justice.

Dorothy Randall appeals from a take nothing judgment. In two points of error she asserts that the trial court's judgment should be reversed because the court failed to file findings of fact and conclusions of law after appellant's timely requests and because the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment in favor of appellee, C.B. Jennings. We sustain appellant's first point, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand the cause for retrial on the merits.

After many years of marriage, Dorothy and Willie Randall divorced in 1977; however, they continued to live together and represented themselves to others as man and wife. In 1984 Willie Randall transferred several thousand dollars to appellee C.B. Jennings, but the men failed to document the purpose of the transfers. Jennings subsequently bought a commercial truck and painted the initials "W.R." and "C.B." on its door. Appellee operated the truck for hire, with Willie Randall sometimes assisting in delivering the loads. The two men opened a joint checking account, and Jennings made payments to Mr. Randall of approximately $150 per week during those weeks in which Jennings found work for the trucking operation. Willie Randall died in 1986. As administrator of Mr. Randall's estate, appellant brought suit against Jennings for a final accounting of the trucking partnership which she alleged the deceased and Jennings had formed. Trial was to the court, and the court signed the judgment in favor of Jennings on June 5, 1989. On June 14, 1989, appellant filed her request for written findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on July 3rd she re-urged her request. The court responded to neither demand, and appellant subsequently perfected this appeal.

In her first point of error appellant claims that the court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law after appellant's timely requests. For this reason appellant asserts that this court should reverse the lower court's judgment and remand the cause for new trial. We agree.

This court has previously concluded that if the trial court fails to prepare and file findings of fact and conclusions of law after proper requests, harm is presumed. Joseph v. Joseph, 731 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (citation omitted); see also Barnes v. Coffman, 753 S.W.2d 823, 823 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Eye Site, Inc. v. Blackburn, 750 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied). The presumption of harm may be overcome if the record affirmatively shows that the complaining party suffered no injury. Joseph, 731 S.W.2d at 598 (citing Barfield v. Emery, 107 Tex. 306, 177 S.W. 952, 953 (1915)). However, in factually complicated situations in which there are two or more possible grounds for recovery or defense, or in situations where there are disputed facts to be resolved, an undue burden is placed upon an appellant, and the inference of harm cannot be defeated. Joseph, 731 S.W.2d at 598.

In the case before us the trial court did not reveal its basis for denying any relief to appellant in its final judgment. Some evidence of a partnership does exist in the record. Additionally, appellee challenged both the existence of the partnership as well as appellant's standing as the deceased's surviving widow. As a result, in her remaining point of error appellant was forced to guess the reasoning used by the court to reach its conclusions. Clearly, Randall has suffered harm in the presentation of her appeal. We therefore sustain appellant's first point. Although some intermediate courts have chosen to abate rather than reverse cases in which the trial court failed to file requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, Id. at 599 (citations omitted), we choose not to deviate from the long-established procedure of reversing and remanding the case for new trial. Id. at 600.

In affirming appellant's first point of error we find it unnecessary to address her remaining point. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded.