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Docket Number

No. D-145.

Judges

John Louis Coffey
Frank Hoover Easterbrook
Kenneth Francis Ripple

Acts

Crimes And Criminal Procedure — Firearms — Crimes — Penalties

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: In the Matter of John Millard Beck

Factual and Procedural Background

John Millard Beck was appointed under the Criminal Justice Act to represent James K. Gaylor on appeal. Beck delayed in prosecuting the appeal, and when he eventually filed an appellate brief it, together with its statement of facts and argument, totaled less than two pages. The court determined in an unpublished order that Beck's filing would not have sufficed even as an Anders brief (which the filing did not purport to be). The court relieved Beck, appointed new counsel for Gaylor, and issued an order directing Beck to show cause why he should not be disciplined under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c).

The court's show-cause order enumerated specific concerns regarding Beck's performance and professionalism: failure to timely file the required jurisdictional statement until after threatened sanctions; failure to obey a scheduling order or to seek an extension, resulting in a tardy brief; inclusion in the brief of a jurisdictional statement from a different case; absence of a factual statement and failure to cite or summarize the record; an argument section one page long that did not analyze the evidence or test sufficiency of the prosecution's case; and unprofessional formatting (all-capital letters).

Beck filed a three-page, untimely answer to the show-cause order, waived his right to an oral hearing, and asserted that he was a sole practitioner and that this was his first appeal. His response admitted error regarding the scheduling order but otherwise did not provide an adequate explanation for the deficiencies. The court found his explanations inadequate and questioned whether Beck could render more good than harm to clients who rely on his services. After considering the matter, the court suspended Beck from the bar of the Seventh Circuit, with conditions permitting him to apply for reinstatement after one year upon satisfying specified requirements.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Beck's conduct and the quality of his appellate work warranted discipline under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c).
If discipline was warranted, what form of discipline was appropriate (e.g., suspension, disbarment, or other remedial measures) and what conditions, if any, should be attached to potential reinstatement.

Arguments of the Parties

Beck's Arguments

Beck stated he is a sole practitioner and that this was his first appeal.
As to the scheduling order, Beck admitted error, acknowledged that he was "in the wrong" and asserted that he submitted an answer to the court's show-cause order.
Beck stated he never intended to jeopardize his client's case.
Beck offered to "attend a seminar on Appellant [sic] work," a promise the court noted and later relied on as a condition for potential reinstatement.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any opposing party's arguments; it focuses on the court's show-cause order, Beck's response, and the court's evaluation and disposition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1392-94 (7th Cir. 1990)	Illustration of minimum professional standards required for appellate advocacy and briefs.	The court invoked John v. Barron to show that Beck's one-page argument and uninformative factual statement fell well below the circuit's minimum professional standards for appellate briefs.
United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1990)	Authority concerning the court's responsibility to ensure competence and ethical standards of the bar (disciplinary context).	The court cited Williams among other cases to support the proposition that mechanisms of professional discipline may be used to ensure competence and dedication of the bar, not solely for theft or overt ethical violations.
SEC v. Suter, 832 F.2d 988 (7th Cir. 1987)	Support for the court's role in enforcing professional standards and disciplining attorneys where appropriate.	The court relied on Suter as part of a group of precedents establishing the propriety of disciplinary action to maintain bar standards.
United States v. Gerrity, 804 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1986)	Precedent addressing judicial oversight of attorney competence and conduct in federal courts.	The court cited Gerrity to demonstrate prior instances where the court exercised disciplinary oversight to protect the integrity of the bar and the interests of litigants.
United States v. Bush, 797 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1986)	Another authority referenced for the principle that courts may discipline attorneys to ensure competent representation.	Used by the court as further precedent supporting the exercise of disciplinary authority in appropriate cases.
El-Gharabli v. INS, 796 F.2d 935, 938-40 (7th Cir. 1986)	Support for the court's supervisory role over attorney competence and compliance with professional standards.	The court cited El-Gharabli among cases establishing the importance of ensuring competence and ethical conduct by members of the bar.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from factual findings about Beck's conduct and the content of his filings to legal conclusions about the appropriate disciplinary response:

The court observed a pattern of procedural dereliction: failure to timely file the required jurisdictional statement until after threatened sanctions; failure to comply with a scheduling order or to request an extension; and filing an untimely brief only after a show-cause order.
The court identified substantive deficiencies in the brief itself: inclusion of a jurisdictional statement from an unrelated case; lack of any meaningful statement of facts (the purported "STATEMENT OF FACTS" containing only the defendant's assertion that he did not "feel" the verdict was supported); a one-page argument that did not analyze the evidence or address legal sufficiency; and unprofessional formatting (all-capital letters).
The court reviewed Beck's answer to the show-cause order, noting it was untimely and provided only limited explanations (sole practitioner; first appeal; admission of fault as to the scheduling order). The court found these responses inadequate to justify or excuse the conduct and to demonstrate competence.
The court compared Beck's performance to the minimum professional standards articulated in earlier precedents (e.g., John v. Barron) and invoked a line of cases that recognize the judicial responsibility to ensure competence and ethical behavior by members of the bar (United States v. Williams; SEC v. Suter; United States v. Gerrity; United States v. Bush; El-Gharabli v. INS).
Balancing considerations of punishment, protection of clients, and potential for rehabilitation, the court concluded that suspension, rather than immediate disbarment, was an appropriate remedy: disbarment may be the only "safe" resource, but the court left open the possibility that Beck could improve and thereby be readmitted upon satisfying specific conditions.
The court therefore imposed a conditional suspension designed to protect the bar and future clients while providing a path to reinstatement contingent on demonstrable remediation of appellate advocacy skills and confirmation of good standing in other relevant bars.

Holding and Implications

The court suspended John Millard Beck from the bar of the Seventh Circuit. The suspension is subject to the proviso that after one year Beck may apply for reinstatement only if he satisfies the court's specified conditions.

The conditions for reinstatement specified by the court are drawn from the opinion and include:

Submission of an application for reinstatement after one year.
Proof that Beck has taken a course in appellate advocacy (the course should include writing and submitting for professional evaluation one or more appellate briefs); the court noted ALI-ABA as an example of a provider offering such courses.
Provision of the appellate brief(s) submitted as part of the course or comparable evidence of professional skills evaluated by others.
Certificates demonstrating Beck's good standing in the Indiana bar and in the bar of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.

Direct effect: Beck is suspended from this court's bar and must satisfy the stated requirements to seek reinstatement. The opinion does not purport to announce a new legal rule; rather, it applies the court's supervisory and disciplinary authority, as supported by cited precedent, to the particular facts of Beck's conduct and the deficiencies in his appellate representation.

Show full summary ...

IN THE MATTER OF JOHN MILLARD BECK.

PER CURIAM.

This court appointed John Millard Beck under the Criminal Justice Act as counsel for James K. Gaylor. After extended delay, Beck filed a brief with a statement of facts and argument that together do not come to two pages. In an unpublished order, the court concluded that Beck's efforts would not have sufficed even as an Anders brief, which this did not purport to be. We relieved Beck and appointed a new lawyer for Gaylor, and we issued an order requiring Beck to show cause why he should not be subject to discipline under Fed.R.App.P. 46(c). The order told Beck that the "court is particularly concerned about the following:

1. Beck did not file the jurisdictional statement required by this court's rules until after several orders threatening sanctions (including dismissal of the appeal), putting his client's case at risk.

2. A scheduling order issued by the court required Beck to file his opening brief on July 27, 1989. He neither filed the brief nor sought an extension. After we issued a show-cause order on September 27, 1989, requiring both a response and the brief by October 11, Beck finally filed a brief — on October 13. Again such dereliction jeopardizes the client's position.

3. The brief contains a jurisdictional statement from another case, ending: `The United States is appealing the district court's order suppressing evidence prior to trial.' This case is not an appeal by the United States and has nothing to do with suppression of evidence.

4. The brief contains no statement of facts. The full text of the material following the caption `STATEMENT OF FACTS' is: `THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT FEEL THAT THE GUILTY VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PROSECUTION IN FINDING HIM GUILTY OF USE OF A FIREARM WITHIN THE MEANING OF 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).' Mr. Beck does not summarize the evidence or cite to the record, in violation of both this court's rules and the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

5. The argument section of the brief, one page long, does not analyze the evidence or enable the court to determine whether the prosecution's case was legally sufficient.

6. The brief is typed entirely in capital letters and shows other signs of unprofessional preparation."

Beck filed a three-page answer waiving his right to an oral hearing under Rule 46. Like the brief, the answer was untimely.

Beck's answer raises in our minds a substantial question whether he is capable of doing more good than harm for a client using his services. Other than saying that he is a sole practitioner and that this was his first appeal, Beck has no explanation. His full response to paragraph 2 of our order reads:

As For [sic] the scheduling order I was in the wrong and I was show caused [sic] for this. I submitted an answer to the show cause [sic] that was entered against me by this Court. I never intended to jeopardize my clients [sic] case.

Beck does not try to tell us why he filed neither a brief nor an application for an extension of time. His responses to the other aspects of the order are equally feeble. A one-page argument following an uninformative statement that the defendant does not "feel" that the evidence is sufficient — and describing none of the evidence — falls well below minimum professional standards. E.g., John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1392-94 (7th Cir. 1990).

Members of the bar of the Seventh Circuit have an obligation to render competent services. Although the cumbersome mechanisms of professional discipline usually are reserved for lawyers who steal from clients, otherwise violate ethical rules, or frivolously vex adversaries, they are not so limited. It is an important part of the judicial office to ensure the competence and dedication of the bar, as well as its adherence to ethical standards. United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1990); SEC v. Suter, 832 F.2d 988 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Gerrity, 804 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bush, 797 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1986); El-Gharabli v. INS, 796 F.2d 935, 938-40 (7th Cir. 1986). Defendants in criminal cases especially need the courts' aid. Indigent criminal defendants do not select their own lawyers. If counsel offer feeble assistance, meritorious defenses may go unclaimed, or defendants may languish in prison (as Gaylor is) while the court obtains a second lawyer to put up a stiffer defense.

Although disbarment of an incompetent lawyer is the only safe resource, it may be that Beck is capable of better work. We hereby suspend Beck from the bar of this court, with the proviso that after a year he may apply for reinstatement. The application should be accompanied by proof that Beck has taken a course in appellate advocacy and, as part of that course, has written and submitted for professional evaluation one or more appellate briefs. ALI-ABA offers courses of this nature. Beck offered to "attend a seminar on Appellant [sic] work", and we shall hold him to that promise. In applying for reinstatement, Beck should furnish us with the brief submitted as part of the course or provide comparable evidence of professional skills. When applying for reinstatement, Beck also must submit certificates showing his good standing in the Indiana bar and the bar of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.

MATTER OF BECK