JEFFREY E. FROELICH, Judge.
The defendant, Palmer L. Boyd III, is charged with violating R.C. 4511.68(N), which reads in relevant part as follows:
"No person shall stand or park a * * * vehicle * * * in any of the following places:
"* * * (N) At any place where signs prohibit stopping[.]"
The parties have stipulated that the defendant was behind the wheel of a motor vehicle which, with its motor running, while stopped alongside a curb marked with a sign stating "No parking permitted — fire lane."
The defendant argues that he was not in violation of this statute since it only prohibits standing or parking at a place where a sign prohibits "stopping"; that is, defendant contends that since the sign in question did not prohibit stopping, he was not in violation of the statute. The prosecution argues that the definition of "parking" includes stopping or standing, or, alternatively, that the language in R.C. 4511.68(N), which requires a sign prohibiting "stopping," prohibits parking as well.
There are no definitions of "stand," "park" or "stopping" in the Revised Code. At the same time, the court notes that the legislature has made distinctions between the different manners in which a vehicle can come to a stop. For example, R.C. 4511.66 prohibits "stop[ping], park[ing], or leave standing," any vehicle upon the highway; R.C. 4511.661 prohibits permitting a vehicle to "stand unattended"; R.C. 4511.681 deals only with "parking" a vehicle; R.C. 4511.69 deals with "stopp[ing] or park[ing]" a vehicle; and R.C. Chapter 4521 deals with violations of law that regulate the "standing or parking" of vehicles.
The court finds as a matter of fact that the vehicle of the defendant was stopped or standing in an area marked "No parking permitted — fire lane." R.C. 4511.68(N) prohibits such standing or parking only in "any place where signs prohibit stopping." Since the sign where the defendant's vehicle was stopped did not prohibit stopping but only parking, the defendant must be found not guilty. It is beyond the court's authority to attempt to further define "parking" and "stopping" since the legislature has clearly evidenced the desire to distinguish between these acts. Further, the court cannot say that the legislature's action was unreasonable since it could have very well reasoned that fire lanes must be open for emergency traffic, but that if a citizen were only "stopped" in such area, he would not constitute the same sort of hazard as would a "parked" vehicle. In summary, the legislature has evidenced a desire to distinguish between "parking" and "stopping." The statute in question only relates to any place where signs prohibit "stopping." The only sign in this case prohibited "parking"; hence, it was not illegal to "stop" in an area that only prohibited parking.
The defendant is therefore found not guilty.
Judgment for defendant.