Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
In a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, the defendant argued that he had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial. This part of the defendant's motion was based on statutory provisions (CPL 30.30) as well as constitutional provisions ( U.S. Const 6th, 14th Amends; CPL 30.20; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213). In order to induce the People to agree to the proposed plea bargain, the defendant expressly agreed to waive appellate review of both his statutory and his constitutional speedy trial arguments.
With respect to his claim that his statutory speedy trial rights were violated, the defendant's express waiver was redundant, since his plea of guilty operated as an automatic forfeiture of his right to appellate review of this issue (see, People v. O'Brien, 56 N.Y.2d 1009, 1010; People v. Gooden, 151 A.D.2d 773; People v. Green, 146 A.D.2d 281, 283, n 2, affd 75 N.Y.2d 902; People v. Coombs, 138 A.D.2d 619, 620; People v. Boyd, 133 A.D.2d 641, 642; People v. James, 125 A.D.2d 412). While a constitutional speedy trial claim is not similarly subject to an automatic forfeiture, it may be the subject of an express waiver (see, People v. Rodriguez, 50 N.Y.2d 553, 557; People v. Gooden, supra, at 774; People v. Harris, 103 A.D.2d 891; People v Galante, 91 A.D.2d 690). There was no duress exerted in this case and the defendant's waiver was voluntary, so that the exception to this general rule reflected in cases such as People v Blakley ( 34 N.Y.2d 311) and People v. White ( 32 N.Y.2d 393) does not apply (see, People v. Gooden, supra, at 774; cf., People v Green, 146 A.D.2d 281, 283, supra). The waiver should therefore be enforced.
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J.P., Bracken, Lawrence and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.