Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered. No questions of fact have been raised or considered.
The hearing court found that prior to receiving Miranda warnings, the defendant did not make a statement which tainted his subsequent statements. That finding was based largely upon an assessment of credibility (Amend v. Hurley, 293 N.Y. 587; People v. Lopez, 95 A.D.2d 241, 252) and, under the facts of this case, we decline to overturn it (People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759; People v. Vail, 90 A.D.2d 917, 918).
Reversal, however, is mandated on the ground that the trial court, sua sponte, and over the defendant's strenuous objections, submitted a "redacted" indictment to the jury. Unlike People v. Moore ( 71 N.Y.2d 684), the jury here did not seek any such information, the prosecutor objected as well, and the submission therefore cannot be justified on the basis of any statutory obligation to comply with a jury request (CPL 310.30; People v. Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, 301; People v. Moore, supra, at 686; People v. Lourido, 70 N.Y.2d 428).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit (see, People v. Segal, 54 N.Y.2d 58, 66; People v. Westergard, 113 A.D.2d 640, 646-648; People v Fitzgerald, 26 A.D.2d 712, 713). Bracken, J.P., Sullivan, Harwood and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.