MILLER v. MOTOROLA, INC

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. 1-89-1178

Attorney(S)

Stanley H. Jakala, of Berwyn, for appellant. Wildman, Harrold, Allen Dixon, of Chicago (Michael L. McCluggage, Georgia L. Vlamis, and Michael J. Bolton, of counsel), for appellee.

Judges

PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Joy V. Miller, the plaintiff, filed an action in the Circuit Court of Cook County against her employer, Motorola, Inc., seeking damages for the defendant's disclosure of her mastectomy surgery to her co-employees. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice pursuant to section 2-615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. The circuit court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal, contending that her pleadings supported claims for the torts of public disclosure of private facts and unreasonable intrusion into the seclusion of another. The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on the public disclosure claim.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the plaintiff's pleadings sufficiently state a cause of action for the tort of public disclosure of private facts under Illinois law.
Whether the plaintiff's factual allegations support a claim for the tort of unreasonable intrusion into the seclusion of another.
What constitutes sufficient "publicity" to satisfy the public disclosure element of the invasion of privacy tort.
Whether the disclosed private facts were highly offensive to a reasonable person, as required to establish the tort of public disclosure of private facts.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

Plaintiff asserted claims under two branches of the invasion of privacy tort: public disclosure of private facts and unreasonable intrusion into seclusion.
She alleged that her medical information, specifically regarding her mastectomy surgery, was disclosed by the defendant to co-employees without her consent.
Plaintiff claimed this disclosure caused her severe physical, mental, and emotional distress, resulting in early retirement.
She contended that the pleadings met the requirements for publicity and offensiveness necessary to state a claim for public disclosure of private facts.

Defendant's Arguments

Defendant argued that the allegations were insufficient to show publicity because Illinois law requires the disclosure to be widespread and in written form.
Defendant relied primarily on Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Development Co., asserting that oral communications to a limited group do not constitute public disclosure.
Defendant contended that the plaintiff's complaint did not satisfy the elements of the public disclosure tort or the intrusion tort.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Development Co., 34 Ill. App.3d 130, 339 N.E.2d 274 (1975)	Limitations on public disclosure tort in the context of oral and written communications related to private debts; requirement of widespread disclosure.	The court distinguished Midwest as specific to creditor-debtor privacy interests and did not adopt its publicity requirements as universally applicable to all public disclosure claims.
Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App.3d 435, 390 N.E.2d 945 (1979)	Recognition of public disclosure of private facts as a cause of action in Illinois.	Referenced as part of Illinois appellate recognition of the public disclosure tort.
Mucklow v. John Marshall Law School, 176 Ill. App.3d 886, 531 N.E.2d 941 (1988)	Recognition and elements of unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion tort.	Used to outline necessary elements of intrusion tort, which plaintiff's facts did not satisfy.
Melvin v. Burling, 141 Ill. App.3d 786, 490 N.E.2d 1011 (1986)	Recognition and elements of unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion tort.	Supported the court's articulation of intrusion tort elements.
Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill. App.3d 642, 391 N.E.2d 54 (1979)	Non-recognition of intrusion tort in Illinois.	Referenced to acknowledge conflicting appellate views on intrusion tort recognition.
Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 Ill. App.3d 1006, 345 N.E.2d 37 (1976)	Non-recognition of intrusion tort in Illinois.	Referenced to show appellate disagreement on intrusion tort.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652B, 652C, 652D, 652E (1977)	Definitions and elements of invasion of privacy torts, including public disclosure of private facts and intrusion upon seclusion.	Primary source for defining the torts and their elements; court relied heavily on its commentary to interpret publicity and offensiveness requirements.
McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir. 1985)	Recognition of flexibility in publicity requirement where special relationship to the "public" exists.	Supported court's adoption of a flexible approach to publicity when disclosure is to a limited but significant group (e.g., co-employees).
Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522 (1977)	Public disclosure to a limited public with a special relationship to plaintiff can satisfy publicity requirement.	Used to justify that disclosure to fellow employees can constitute sufficient publicity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the two privacy tort claims asserted by plaintiff: public disclosure of private facts and unreasonable intrusion into seclusion. It recognized that Illinois appellate courts have accepted the public disclosure tort but remain divided on the intrusion tort.

Regarding the public disclosure claim, the court examined the publicity requirement, rejecting defendant's narrow reading of Midwest Glass Co. as limiting publicity to widespread written communications. Instead, the court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts' broader definition of publicity as communication to the public at large or a sufficiently large group making the information substantially certain to become public knowledge.

The court acknowledged that oral communications can satisfy the publicity requirement if made to a sufficiently broad audience or a "public" with a special relationship to the plaintiff. It found that disclosure of plaintiff's medical condition to co-employees met this standard, given the special relationship between plaintiff and fellow employees.

On the offensiveness element, the court held that it could not determine as a matter of law that disclosure of a mastectomy would not be highly offensive to a reasonable person, leaving this as a question of fact for a jury.

Turning to the intrusion tort, the court reviewed the required elements and found that plaintiff's allegations did not show an unauthorized intrusion into her seclusion, but rather the dissemination of information voluntarily provided to defendant. Thus, the court declined to find that plaintiff stated a claim for unreasonable intrusion.

Consequently, the court reversed the circuit court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings solely on the public disclosure claim.

Holding and Implications

The appellate court issued a REVERSED AND REMANDED ruling.

The court held that plaintiff's complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for the tort of public disclosure of private facts, as the disclosure to co-employees constituted sufficient publicity and the offensiveness of the disclosure was a factual issue for the jury. However, the court held that plaintiff did not state a claim for unreasonable intrusion into seclusion because the facts did not allege unauthorized intrusion.

The direct effect is that the case proceeds on the public disclosure claim, while the intrusion claim is not supported by the pleadings. The opinion does not establish new precedent on the intrusion tort but clarifies the application of the publicity requirement in public disclosure claims under Illinois law by adopting a flexible approach recognizing special relationships with the "public."

Show full summary ...

JOY V. MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOTOROLA, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Joy V. Miller (plaintiff) filed an action in the circuit court of Cook County against her employer, Motorola, Inc. (defendant), seeking recovery for damages resulting from defendant's disclosure of her mastectomy surgery to plaintiff's co-employees. Plaintiff appeals from the circuit court's order dismissing her complaint with prejudice pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-615), contending that her pleadings support claims for the torts of public disclosure of private facts and unreasonable intrusion into the seclusion of another.

Plaintiff's asserted claims comprise two of the four branches of the common law torts for the invasion of privacy rights as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: (1) an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) an appropriation of another's name or likeness; (3) a public disclosure of private facts; and (4) publicity which reasonably places another in a false light before the public. (Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652B, 652C, 652D, 652E, at 378-94 (1977); W. Keeton, Prosser Keeton on Torts § 117, at 849-69 (5th ed. 1984).) The few Illinois appellate courts which have confronted claims under the public disclosure branch have recognized the cause of action ( Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Development Co. (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 130, 339 N.E.2d 274; Geisberger v. Willuhn (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 435, 390 N.E.2d 945), while the appellate courts facing claims under the intrusion branch disagree regarding whether such a cause of action should be recognized in Illinois (compare Mucklow v. John Marshall Law School (1988), 176 Ill. App.3d 886, 531 N.E.2d 941 (recognizing an intrusion cause of action); Melvin v. Burling (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 786, 490 N.E.2d 1011 (recognizing an intrusion cause of action); Bank of Indiana v. Tremunde (1977), 50 Ill. App.3d 480, 365 N.E.2d 295 (implicitly recognizing an intrusion cause of action); with Kelly v. Franco (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 642, 391 N.E.2d 54 (intrusion cause of action not recognized); Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 1006, 345 N.E.2d 37 (intrusion cause of action not recognized)).

• 1 Considering first plaintiff's public disclosure claim, this cause of action is defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts as follows:

"One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that

(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and

(b) is not of a legitimate concern to the public." (Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D (1977).)

To state a cause of action for this tort, the plaintiff must plead and prove that (1) publicity was given to the disclosure of private facts; (2) the facts were private, and not public, facts; and (3) the matter made public was such as to be highly offensive to a reasonable person. (W. Keeton, Prosser Keeton on Torts § 117, at 856-57 (5th ed. 1984).) The parties here dispute whether the first and third requirements have been adequately pled.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that she consulted with defendant's resident nurse, Felicia Masters, relative to three leaves of absence taken by plaintiff from 1984 to 1986 to undergo mastectomy and reconstructive surgeries and that Masters advised her during those consultations that her medical information would be confidential. The complaint further alleges that plaintiff, who did not consent to the release of any of her medical information which was maintained at defendant's place of business, was told by a co-employee on or about October 1, 1987, that she had been informed of plaintiff's mastectomy. As a result of defendant's disclosure and plaintiff's belief of the awareness by numerous other employees of her condition, the complaint alleges that plaintiff suffered severe physical, mental and emotional distress and took an early retirement from her 23-year employment with defendant.

Defendant argues that these allegations are insufficient to show that any private facts were publicized because Illinois law requires the disclosure be widespread and that the communication be written. The sole Illinois authority cited by defendant to support its assertion is Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Development Co. (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 130, 339 N.E.2d 274, where the court found the plaintiff's allegations of defendant's oral and written communications to persons having an interest in certain condominium units regarding the plaintiff real estate company's failure to pay for mirrors installed by defendant in the units did not state a cause of action for the public disclosure of a private debt. Citing cases from other jurisdictions, the court noted that oral communications cannot be a basis for an invasion of privacy action involving attempts to collect debts. The court, after stating that the privacy right is subject to limitations where legitimate interests are involved and acknowledging the creditor's right to take reasonable action to persuade payment, further noted that the notices of indebtedness there were disseminated not to the general public but only to a limited number of persons who had a natural and proper interest in the ability and reputation of plaintiff to pay its debt. Midwest, 34 Ill. App.3d at 134-35, 339 N.E.2d at 277-78.

We do not read Midwest as establishing the general elements asserted by defendant for meeting the publicity requirement in all public disclosure cases. Rather, the decision appears to be an attempt to reconcile a person's privacy rights with the legitimate interests of creditors and other interested parties to a person's indebtedness. As Illinois courts have not yet delved into the necessary elements to establish the "publicity" requirement in public disclosure cases, we will turn to other authorities to assist our determination here.

• 2 The comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts state the following as to the publication requirement:

"[Public disclosure] * * * means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. * * *

Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy * * * to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private life to a single person or even to a small group of persons. On the other hand, any publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small circulation, or in a handbill distributed to a large number of persons, or any broadcast over the radio, or statement made in an address to a large audience, is sufficient to give publicity [to a private fact]." (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, comment a, at 384-85 (1977).)

We agree with the Restatement's appreciation of the importance of a person's privacy with regard to oral communications as well as written communications and its recognition that it is the extent of the communication that is dispositive of whether the communication is publicized.

• 3 The Restatement indicates that the required communication must be more than that made to a small group; rather, the communication must be made to the public at large. In acknowledging this general requirement, however, some courts have recognized the need for flexibility in the application of the Restatement's theory to permit recovery for egregious conduct. (See McSurely v. McClellan (D.C. Cir. 1985), 753 F.2d 88.) These courts have realized that in circumstances where a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the "public" to whom the information has been disclosed, the disclosure may be just as devastating to the person even though the disclosure was made to a limited number of people. ( McSurely, 753 F.2d at 112; Beaumont v. Brown (1977), 401 Mich. 80, 104-15, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531.) The court in Beaumont explained:

"Communication of embarrassing facts about an individual to a public not concerned with that individual and with whom the individual is not concerned obviously is not a `serious interference' with plaintiff's right to privacy, although it might be `unnecessary' or `unreasonable'. An invasion of a plaintiff's right to privacy is important if it exposes private facts to a public whose knowledge of those facts would be embarrassing to the plaintiff. Such a public might be the general public, if the person were a public figure or a particular public such as fellow employees, club members, church members, family, or neighbors, if the person were not a public figure." ( Beaumont, 401 Mich. at 104-05, 257 N.W.2d at 531.)

We adopt the position of the above authorities that the public disclosure requirement may be satisfied by proof that the plaintiff has a special relationship with the "public" to whom the information is disclosed. Plaintiff's allegation that her medical condition was disclosed to her fellow employees sufficiently satisfies the requirement that publicity be given to the private fact.

• 4 Turning now to defendant's argument that the pleadings are insufficient to show that the matter disclosed would be objectionable or highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, we cannot say as a matter of law that the disclosure of an operation of such a personal nature would not be highly offensive to the reasonable person. Thus, the issue presents a question of fact for the jury to determine.

• 5, 6 While we find that plaintiff's pleadings sufficiently state a cause of action for public disclosure of private facts, we do not believe the factual allegations fit into the second category of the privacy torts asserted by plaintiff. The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes the tort of the unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another in the following manner:

"One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, at 378 (1977).)

Illinois courts which have recognized such a cause of action have outlined the following elements necessary to be pled and proven by the plaintiff: (1) an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiff's seclusion; (2) the intrusion must be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (3) the matter upon which the intrusion occurs must be private; and (4) the intrusion causes anguish and suffering. ( Mucklow, 176 Ill. App.3d at 893-94, 531 N.E.2d at 946; Melvin, 141 Ill. App.3d at 789, 490 N.E.2d at 1013-14.) Plaintiff's factual allegations do not satisfy this action's unauthorized intrusion element. The alleged wrongful actions involve the dissemination or publication of information voluntarily provided to defendant by plaintiff, not defendant's unauthorized intrusion. Thus, without expressing a view as to the appellate court conflict regarding the recognition of this cause of action, we hold that the alleged actions here do not constitute an unreasonable intrusion into the seclusion of another.

Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's order granting defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice and remand the cause for further proceedings on plaintiff's complaint alleging the tort of public disclosure of private facts.

Reversed and remanded.

CAMPBELL and O'CONNOR, JJ., concur.