STATE v. BROWN

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Docket Number

No. WD 41415.

Attorney(S)

David S. Durbin, John L. Vohs, Office of Public Defender, Kansas City, for appellant. William Webster, Atty. Gen., Christine A. Alsop, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Judges

ULRICH, Judge.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Pamela Brown was convicted of child abuse under § 568.060, RSMo 1986, following a bench trial and sentenced to four years incarceration. The case arose after police responded to a complaint by Brown's eldest daughter that Brown was withholding her granddaughter and had chained Brown's twelve-year-old daughter, Takeisha, to a bed on an enclosed back porch of her mother's house. Police attempted to gain entry to the porch, eventually entering after cutting a hole in a screen door. Officers observed children inside, including Takeisha, who had visible marks on her wrists. A search warrant was later obtained and executed, resulting in the seizure of an extension cord, chains, keys, and locks. Takeisha was medically examined and found to have scars and marks consistent with prolonged physical abuse.

Brown appealed her conviction, challenging the legality of the searches and the admissibility of evidence seized. The trial court admitted the evidence and the judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Missouri Court of Appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the initial warrantless search of Brown's residence was conducted without probable cause and therefore illegal.
Whether the subsequent search pursuant to a warrant was invalid due to reliance on information obtained during the initial illegal search and alleged factual misrepresentations in the warrant affidavit.
Whether the admission of evidence seized in the searches violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 15 of the Missouri Constitution, and § 542.261, RSMo 1986 et seq.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The initial warrantless search lacked probable cause and was therefore illegal.
The search warrant was improperly issued based on information obtained during the initial illegal search and from Takeisha, rendering the subsequent search unlawful.
The affidavit supporting the warrant contained factual misrepresentations, invalidating the warrant.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State v. Miller, 650 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Mo. banc 1983)	Harmless error doctrine regarding admission of improperly seized evidence.	The court applied the harmless error standard to conclude that the admission of seized items did not prejudice Brown's case beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Baker, 741 S.W.2d 63, 66-67 (Mo.App. 1987)	Harmless error doctrine and evidentiary standards for admission of contested evidence.	The court relied on this precedent to support its finding that the contested exhibits’ admission was harmless error and did not affect the outcome of the trial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court assumed, without deciding, that the initial search was illegal and that the later search warrant was invalid due to reliance on information obtained during the initial search and alleged misrepresentations. Despite these assumptions, the court found that the introduction of the seized physical evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Brown herself admitted to chaining and striking Takeisha. The court noted that Brown’s decision to testify was not influenced by the admission of the contested evidence since the motion to suppress was considered during trial and no pre-trial hearing was held. Therefore, even if the evidence should have been suppressed, its admission did not prejudice Brown’s defense or affect the trial’s outcome. The court relied on established harmless error precedents to support this conclusion and affirmed the judgment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment of conviction for child abuse is affirmed.

Implications: The court’s decision directly upholds the conviction and sentence imposed on Pamela Brown. It establishes that even if evidence was obtained through an illegal search, its admission may be deemed harmless error if the defendant’s own testimony corroborates the contested evidence and the error does not affect the outcome. No new precedent was established beyond applying existing harmless error principles.

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STATE OF MISSOURI, RESPONDENT, v. PAMELA BROWN, APPELLANT.

ULRICH, Judge.

Pamela Brown appeals her conviction for abuse of a child, § 568.060, RSMo 1986, following trial by the court. She was sentenced to four years incarceration. The judgment is affirmed.

Ms. Brown lived with four of her children, including twelve-year-old Takeisha, on the enclosed back porch of her mother's house. On the afternoon of April 28, 1988, Kansas City police officers went to Ms. Brown's residence after fourteen-year-old Tamika Brown, Ms. Brown's eldest daughter, telephoned a complaint to the police that Ms. Brown possessed Tamika's daughter within the enclosed porch and would not permit Tamika to see her child. When police officers arrived, Ms. Brown exited the residence and spoke to the officers. The only trial testimony of Ms. Brown's exit from the porch omits whether Takeisha accompanied her. The affidavit filed by police seeking a search warrant recounts that Takeisha accompanied Ms. Brown when she exited the porch. Twelve-year-old Takeisha stood behind Ms. Brown. Ms. Brown and the child went back inside the porch, and the door was locked. Police officers were unsuccessful in attempting to convince Ms. Brown to open the porch door, and Tamika informed the officers that her mother would not allow them access because Tamika's sister, Takeisha, was continuously tied or chained to a bed. Police officers then approached the residence and heard the rattling of chains. The officers asked Ms. Brown to permit them to see the children, and Ms. Brown refused to open the door. Ms. Brown's sister arrived and confirmed to police officers that Ms. Brown often tied Takeisha to a bed. The officers informed Ms. Brown that if she would not voluntarily open the door, they would use necessary force to gain entrance. Hearing no response, a police officer cut a hole in the screen door and opened it. Ms. Brown then opened the wooden door, and the officers entered the porch. They observed the children present, including Takeisha, standing behind Ms. Brown. Ms. Brown became angry and directed the officers to leave her house. When they did not leave, Ms. Brown began swinging her arms and kicking her feet. Thereafter, the police officers handcuffed Ms. Brown's wrists and shackled her legs. One of the officers observed marks on Takeisha's wrists. Ms. Brown was asked to sign a consent to search form, and she refused. A statement from Takeisha was taken by police officers, and a search warrant was obtained and executed. Police officers recovered an extension cord, chains, keys and locks from Ms. Brown's residence.

Later that same day, Takeisha was taken to a hospital and examined for physical abuse by a pediatric physician, who testified at trial. Linear scars were observed on Takeisha's back and buttocks consistent with having been struck with a cord, belt or whip. Circumferential markings were observed on both her wrists. Her hands were puffy, consistent with having had tightly constricting devices around her wrists for several hours impeding venous blood flow. The skin underneath the marks on her wrists was thickened and hyperpigmented (darker), consistent with chronic constriction around her wrists over a period of weeks or months. On each arm were scars consistent with having been inflicted as the child raised her arms responsively attempting to protect herself from being struck by a cord, belt or whip.

Ms. Brown contends that the items seized from her residence and admitted as evidence at trial were seized improperly in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and in violation of Article I, § 15 of the Missouri Constitution and § 542.261, RSMo 1986 et seq. Ms. Brown alleges that (1) the initial search of her residence without a search warrant was conducted without probable cause and was illegal; (2) the subsequent search, although conducted pursuant to a search warrant, was illegal because it was issued as a result of conversations the affiant seeking the warrant had with police officers present at Ms. Brown's residence during the initial search and with Takeisha Brown; and (3) the warrant was invalid because the affidavit presented to obtain the warrant and relied upon by the issuing Associate Circuit Judge contained factual misrepresentations.

Assuming that Ms. Brown's contentions are correct, arguendo, and the padlocks, chains, and extension cord seized from her residence as a result of the warrant authorized search should not have been introduced, their introduction as evidence was not prejudicial to her. The tangible evidence obtained from Ms. Brown's residence corroborated Takeisha's trial testimony that she was chained to a bed and was, on one occasion, struck with an extension cord. However, Ms. Brown testified at trial and admitted several times to having chained Takeisha to a bed at night for several months and to having struck her with an extension cord. By agreement of the parties, a pre-trial hearing on Ms. Brown's motion to suppress the evidence was not conducted and the motion was considered with the case. The court ruled, after hearing all the evidence during trial, including Ms. Brown's testimony, to admit the exhibits. Thus, Ms. Brown's decision to testify was not influenced by the court's decision to admit the disputed evidence. Ms. Brown was not prejudiced by the introduction of the contested exhibits even if they should have been suppressed. The introduction of the objects seized from Ms. Brown's residence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Miller, 650 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Mo. banc 1983); State v. Baker, 741 S.W.2d 63, 66-67 (Mo.App. 1987). The judgment is affirmed.

All concur.