We find no merit to defendant's claim that the element of "forcible compulsion" (Penal Law § 130.00) was not established beyond a reasonable doubt. At the trial the victim testified that he was frozen in fear, and that he complied with defendant's requests because he did not want to die. The inquiry must focus on what the victim, observing defendant's conduct, feared defendant would or might do if the victim did not comply with his demands. (People v. Thompson, 72 N.Y.2d 410, 415-416, rearg denied 73 N.Y.2d 870; People v. Coleman, 42 N.Y.2d 500, 505.) The jury's determination that the victim feared for his life has a firm basis in the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People (People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490). The case at bar was prosecuted under the theory that defendant's threat placed his victim in fear and the fact that defendant may not have carried out his threat cannot transform the victim's submission into consent.
None of defendant's complaints about the court's charge has been preserved as a matter of law, and we decline to reach them.
We have also considered defendant's contention that several evidentiary rulings by the court deprived him of a fair trial, but find his arguments to be without merit.
Concur — Kupferman, J.P., Sullivan, Carro and Milonas, JJ.