JOHNSON v. LYNAUGH

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Docket Number

No. C-8538.

Attorney(S)

R. Wayne Johnson, Snyder, pro se. Jim Mattox, Michael J. Hodge, Anthony J. Nelson, Austin, for respondent.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

Acts

Judiciary And Judicial Procedure — Fees And Costs — Procedure — Proceedings In Forma Pauperis

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

R. Wayne Johnson, an inmate of the Texas Department of Corrections, filed a pro se in forma pauperis lawsuit against James Lynaugh, the director of the institution. Johnson alleged that three disciplinary rules were unconstitutionally vague and that he was denied the use of an audiotape player in his cell to play tapes as part of his religious practice. He claimed these actions violated various provisions of the Texas Constitution, specifically article I, sections 3, 3a, 6, 13, and 19. The trial court dismissed Johnson's action with prejudice as frivolous under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 13.001. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, and Johnson sought review in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Johnson's claims challenging the disciplinary rules and denial of religious accommodation were frivolous under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 13.001, justifying dismissal.
Whether section 13.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code violates the "open courts" provision of the Texas Constitution (article I, section 13), as contended by Johnson for the first time in this Court.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)	Authorizes dismissal of frivolous or malicious in forma pauperis suits in federal court.	The court of appeals analogized Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 13.001 to this federal statute to guide dismissal standards.
Payne v. Lynaugh, 843 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1988)	Factors for determining frivolousness under § 1915(d), including doubt about dismissal based on inability to prove facts.	Referenced to note that the Fifth Circuit questioned dismissal based on inability to prove facts, corresponding to subsection 13.001(b)(3).
Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1986)	Same as Payne; application of factors for dismissal under § 1915(d).	Used to illustrate judicial caution in dismissing claims solely for inability to prove facts.
Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1986)	Application of factors for dismissal under § 1915(d).	Supports the standard for determining frivolousness used by the court of appeals.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)	Defines "frivolous" as lacking an arguable basis in law or fact for purposes of § 1915(d).	The Supreme Court of Texas noted that the proper factor to consider in dismissals is whether the claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact (corresponding to § 13.001(b)(2)).
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Wells, 566 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1978)	Procedural rule regarding preservation of constitutional challenges on appeal.	Referenced to explain that Johnson's constitutional challenge to § 13.001 was not properly before the Court because it was not raised earlier.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court acknowledged that the trial court dismissed Johnson's suit as frivolous under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 13.001, which permits dismissal of in forma pauperis actions deemed frivolous or malicious. The court of appeals affirmed this dismissal, relying in part on the "realistic chance of success" factor listed in subsection 13.001(b)(1), and analogizing the statute to the federal statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and related federal case law.

However, the Supreme Court of Texas noted that the court of appeals did not address the Fifth Circuit's reservations about dismissing claims solely on the basis of inability to prove facts (subsection 13.001(b)(3)) and that the United States Supreme Court has indicated that the proper inquiry is whether the claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact (subsection 13.001(b)(2)).

Johnson's constitutional challenge to section 13.001 was rejected as improperly raised for the first time in this Court, citing procedural rules and precedent. The Court explicitly declined to approve dismissal based solely on subsection 13.001(b)(1) or the reasoning employed by the court of appeals.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Johnson's application for writ of error was denied, affirming the dismissal of his action as frivolous under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 13.001.

Implications: This decision directly results in the dismissal of Johnson's claims against Lynaugh. The Court did not establish new precedent regarding the application of section 13.001 beyond affirming the dismissal in this case. The Court also declined to consider Johnson's constitutional challenge to the statute due to procedural default.

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R. Wayne JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. James LYNAUGH, Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

R. Wayne Johnson, an inmate of the Texas Department of Corrections, filed suit pro se in forma pauperis against James Lynaugh, the director of that institution, alleging that three of its disciplinary rules are unconstitutionally vague, and that Johnson has been denied the use of an audiotape player in his cell to play tapes as part of his religion. Based upon these allegations, Johnson asserts that his rights under article I, sections 3, 3a, 6, 13, and 19 of the Texas Constitution have been violated. The trial court granted Lynaugh's motion to dismiss Johnson's action with prejudice as frivolous under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Sec. 13.001, which states:

(a) A court in which an affidavit of inability to pay under Rule 145, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, has been filed may dismiss the action on a finding that:

(1) the allegation of poverty in the affidavit is false; or

(2) the action is frivolous or malicious.

(b) In determining whether an action is frivolous or malicious, the court may consider whether:

(1) the action's realistic chance of success is slight;

(2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact; or

(3) it is clear that the party cannot prove a set of facts in support of the claim.

(c) An action may be dismissed under Subsection (a) as frivolous or malicious either before or after service of process.

The court of appeals affirmed. 766 S.W.2d 393. It analogized section 13.001 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which authorizes dismissal of frivolous or malicious allegations in in forma pauperis suits in federal court. 766 S.W.2d at 394. The court of appeals noted that the three factors listed in section 13.001(b) have also been utilized by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in applying section 1915(d). Id.; see Payne v. Lynaugh, 843 F.2d 177, 178 (5th Cir. 1988); Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 1986); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986). The court of appeals did not observe, however, that the Fifth Circuit has cast doubt upon the appropriateness of dismissal under section 1915(d) based upon the factor which is listed in our statute as section 13.001(b)(3), see Payne, 843 F.2d at 178; Cay, 789 F.2d at 326; and the United States Supreme Court has indicated that the proper factor to be considered in applying section 1915(d) is the one listed in our statute as section 13.001(b)(2), see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, ___ , 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) ("a complaint . . . is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact"). Although the trial court did not specify what factors in section 13.001(b) it considered determinative, the appeals court appears to have based its decision in part at

"The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious."

least upon the first one, holding that Johnson's realistic chance of ultimate success on his claim under article I, section 6 is slight. 766 S.W.2d at 395.

Johnson did not challenge the validity of section 13.001 in the court of appeals. In this court he contends for the first time that section 13.001 violates article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution, the "open courts" provision. This contention is not properly before us. See TEX.R.APP.P. 131(e); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Wells, 566 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Tex. 1978) (withdrawing order granting writ of error). Johnson's application for writ of error is denied. Our action does not, however, imply approval of a dismissal of an action based solely upon section 13.001(b)(1) or of the reasoning of the court of appeals' opinion.