Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant argues that a juror who indicated that she knew one of the prosecution witnesses should have been discharged as "grossly unqualified" (see, CPL 270.35). We disagree.
It is settled that a juror may be discharged as "grossly unqualified" pursuant to CPL 270.35 only "`when it becomes obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict'" (People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290, 298; see also, People v. Cargill, 70 N.Y.2d 687, 689; People v. Anderson, 70 N.Y.2d 729, 730; People v. West, 62 N.Y.2d 708). In the instant case, although the juror knew one of the police witnesses, she stated unequivocally and repeatedly that she could remain impartial. Accordingly, the court's decision not to discharge the juror was within its discretion (see, People v. McDonald, 143 A.D.2d 1050; People v. Mays, 140 A.D.2d 376; People v. McIntyre, 121 A.D.2d 565; People v. O'Connor, 106 A.D.2d 900), which was properly exercised. Eiber, J.P., Harwood, Balletta and O'Brien, JJ., concur.