Ordered that the resettled judgment is affirmed, with costs to the respondents.
As a general rule, a court is constrained to decide cases on the law as it exists at the time of the decision (see, Matter of Temkin v. Karagheuzoff, 34 N.Y.2d 324, 329; Matter of Alscot Investing Corp. v. Incorporated Vil. of Rockville Centre, 99 A.D.2d 754, affd. 64 N.Y.2d 921). The Supreme Court correctly considered a zoning amendment adopted by the Board of Trustees of the Incorporated Village of Hewlett Bay Park (hereinafter the Village) prior to the entry of judgment. The amendment prohibits the alteration, expansion, or enlargement of preexisting nonconforming uses, thereby negating the petitioner's right to build two swimming pools on its premises.
Municipalities have been estopped from applying zoning amendments to property owners only in those instances where vested rights have been acquired or where some form of misconduct or extraordinary delay on the part of the municipality has prevented the acquisition of such rights (see, Cymbidium Dev. Corp. v. Smith, 133 A.D.2d 605, 606; Matter of Faymor Dev. Co. v. Board of Stds. Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 560). The petitioner acknowledges that it did not acquire vested rights to build two swimming pools on its premises. Rather the petitioner contends that the Village's illegal actions in revoking the permit and then adopting the zoning amendment prevented it from acquiring such rights.
We agree with the Supreme Court that this case does not present a "special facts" exception under which the Village could be estopped from applying the zoning amendment to the petitioner. Although the Supreme Court did find prior to the adoption of the zoning amendment, that the Village had arbitrarily and capriciously revoked the building permit previously granted to the petitioner under the preexisting zoning ordinance, there is no indication in the record that the revocation of the permit was illegal (cf., Matter of Temkin v. Karagheuzoff, supra), the product of malice, oppression, manipulation, corruption, bad faith, or a method of delaying the petitioner from acquiring vested rights while the zoning amendment was under consideration (cf., Matter of Pokoik v. Silsdorf, 40 N.Y.2d 769, 772-773; see, Matter of Aversano v. Two Family Use Bd., 117 A.D.2d 665). Sullivan, J.P., Harwood, Miller and O'Brien, JJ., concur.