This dispute involves a small law firm and one of its former associates. Those causes of action sounding in fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, prima facie tort and tortious interference were dismissed by the IAS court. We agree.
The cause of action for fraud fails to detail the facts and circumstances of the alleged fraud with respect to the misrepresentations alleged to have been made by the defendant (see, Mance v. Mance, 128 A.D.2d 448, 449, lv. dismissed 70 N.Y.2d 668) and represents an attempt to sue for fraud based upon a breach of contract (Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. Triumph Adv. Prods., 116 A.D.2d 526, 527).
A breach of contract may sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress only in certain narrow circumstances (see, Hoheb v. Pathology Assocs., 146 A.D.2d 919) which are not pleaded here and it cannot be said that the conduct alleged exceeds all reasonable bounds of decency (James v. Saltsman, 99 A.D.2d 797, 798). Likewise, the claim of abuse of process is without foundation. The service of a summons and complaint or a counterclaim is not "process" susceptible of tortious abuse, even if maliciously motivated (see, Stroock Stroock Lavan v. Beltramini, 157 A.D.2d 590, 591).
Plaintiffs' conclusory allegations do not satisfy the pleading requirement of specificity as to special damages (Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135, 143) or evince a disinterested malevolence (Burns Jackson Miller Summit Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 333). Nor is there any allegation that any third party was directly induced to breach their contract with the plaintiffs by the defendant so as to support a claim of tortious interference (see, Novak v. Rubin, 129 A.D.2d 780, 782).
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Carro, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.