Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The defendant's allegations that he was under emotional stress during the negotiation and execution of the stipulation of settlement are insufficient under the circumstances of this case to sustain his claim that the stipulation should be set aside. The defendant was at all times represented by counsel of his choosing who undertook the negotiations and prepared the ultimate agreement. Moreover, immediately before undergoing a voir dire by the court wherein the defendant stated that he understood the terms of the stipulation and had consulted with his attorney regarding them, he initialed each page of the agreement as well as every change thereto. These circumstances negate the defendant's claim of duress (cf., Beutel v Beutel, 55 N.Y.2d 957; Carosella v Carosella, 129 A.D.2d 547). The defendant's claim that he signed the agreement while under duress is further rebutted by his acknowledgments to the contrary in the agreement itself (see, Carosella v Carosella, supra; Weinstein v Weinstein, 109 A.D.2d 881).
Moreover, the defendant's contention that the stipulation is unconscionable is without merit. He received substantial cash and his vested pension benefits. While the plaintiff may have kept property which was substantially more valuable, "courts will not set aside an agreement on the ground of unconscionability simply because it might have been improvident" (Golfinopoulos v Golfinopoulos, 144 A.D.2d 537, 538; see, Christian v Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 71-72).
Another factor which supports our determination is the fact that the defendant ratified the stipulation by accepting certain benefits thereof before moving to vacate it (see, Golfinopoulos v Golfinopoulos, supra; Beutel v Beutel, supra). Brown, J.P., Eiber, Rosenblatt and Ritter, JJ., concur.