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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1981, plaintiff Harry Macklowe, as general partner, and defendant 42nd Street Development Corporation ("42nd Street"), as limited partner, formed a limited partnership called Elfon Realty Co. ("Elfon") to develop real estate at 42nd Street and 11th Avenue in Manhattan. 42nd Street, a not-for-profit corporation, agreed not to sell or assign its interest in Elfon without plaintiff's prior consent. When 42nd Street needed to raise money, it decided to sell its interest. Plaintiff offered at most $1 million, less than the appraised value. Defendant Condren offered $2.25 million, and plaintiff was given the chance to match this offer but declined. 42nd Street sold and assigned its interest and rights to Condren without plaintiff's consent.

Plaintiff sued defendants alleging four causes of action: breach of contract, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and tortious interference by Condren with contractual relations. The Supreme Court, New York County, granted plaintiff summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and dismissed the other claims.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale and assignment of 42nd Street's interest in the limited partnership without plaintiff's consent constituted a breach of contract.
  2. Whether plaintiff was entitled to equitable remedies such as unjust enrichment or a constructive trust in addition to damages.
  3. Whether defendant Condren tortiously interfered with the contractual relations between plaintiff and 42nd Street.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sullivan v International Fid. Ins. Co., 96 A.D.2d 555 Assignments made in violation of a prohibition clause are void if contract language clearly invalidates such assignments; otherwise, breach gives rise only to damages. The court applied this principle to determine that the covenant against assignment was a personal covenant, thus breach entitled plaintiff only to damages.
Allhusen v Caristo Constr. Corp., 303 N.Y. 446 Supports that clear prohibition clauses render assignments void. Referenced as authority for the rule on invalidity of assignments under clear prohibition clauses.
State Bank v Central Mercantile Bank, 248 N.Y. 428 Same as above. Referenced similarly to support the principle regarding assignment clauses.
Empire Discount Corp. v Bouley Co., 5 Misc.2d 228 Distinguishes between void assignments and personal covenants against assignment. Used to explain that breach of a personal covenant results in damages, not invalidity of assignment.
Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395 Supports the distinction between void assignments and personal covenants. Used to clarify the nature of the covenant in the instant case.
Sacks v Neptune Meter Co., 144 Misc. 70, affd 238 App. Div. 82 Assignments violating personal covenants give rise to damages claims only. Supports limiting plaintiff's remedy to damages for breach of covenant.
Manchester v Kendall, 19 Jones Sp 460, affd 103 N.Y. 638 Same as above. Further authority cited for damages remedy in breach of personal covenant.
Stratford Materials Corp. v Jones, 118 A.D.2d 559 Requirement of improper and unjustified interference to sustain tortious interference claim. Applied to dismiss plaintiff's tortious interference claim for lack of evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the nature of the covenant against assignment in the partnership agreement. It distinguished between a covenant that renders assignments void and one that is merely a personal covenant prohibiting assignment without consent. Since the covenant was personal to 42nd Street, breach did not invalidate the assignment but entitled plaintiff only to damages. The court relied on established precedent to support this interpretation. Regarding the equitable claims for unjust enrichment and constructive trust, the court held that plaintiff's sole remedy was contractual damages, thus dismissing those claims. For the tortious interference claim, the court found no evidence that Condren acted improperly or without justification, and therefore properly dismissed that claim.

Holding and Implications

The court affirmed the summary judgment granting plaintiff damages for breach of contract and dismissed the claims for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and tortious interference.

The direct effect is that plaintiff may recover damages for 42nd Street's breach of the personal covenant against assignment but is not entitled to equitable remedies or damages from Condren for tortious interference. The decision does not establish new legal precedent but applies existing contract and tort principles to the facts.

HARRY MACKLOWE, Appellant, v. 42ND STREET DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al., Respondents.

In 1981, plaintiff, as general partner, and defendant 42nd Street Development Corporation ("42nd Street"), as limited partner, formed a limited partnership called Elfon Realty Co. ("Elfon") for the purpose of developing real estate at 42nd Street and 11th Avenue in Manhattan. 42nd Street is a not-for-profit corporation. As part of their agreement, 42nd Street agreed that it would not sell or assign its interest in the limited partnership without the prior consent of plaintiff.

As 42nd Street needed to raise money, it decided to sell its interest in Elfon. Plaintiff, however, only offered, at most, $1 million, much less than the appraised value of the interest. Defendant Condren offered $2.25 million and plaintiff was given an opportunity to match Condren's offer. As plaintiff would not match the offer, 42nd Street sold its interest and assigned its rights to receive all profits and economic benefits from Elfon to Condren, without plaintiff's consent.

Plaintiff's action against defendants raises four causes of action: the first is for breach of contract; the second is for unjust enrichment; the third seeks a constructive trust; and the fourth is for tortious interference by Condren with contractual relations. Upon plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the IAS Court granted said motion with respect to the first cause of action and dismissed the remaining causes of action.

We agree with the IAS Court that plaintiff's only remedy under the circumstances was to recover actual damages based on the written agreement between the parties. Plaintiff's equitable claims must thus fail. As was stated in Sullivan v International Fid. Ins. Co. ( 96 A.D.2d 555, 556): "With regard to the contractual provision prohibiting assignments without the written consent of International, it has been consistently held that assignments made in contravention of a prohibition clause in a contract are void if the contract contains clear, definite and appropriate language declaring the invalidity of such assignments (Allhusen v Caristo Constr. Corp., 303 N.Y. 446; State Bank v Central Mercantile Bank, 248 N.Y. 428, 435; Empire Discount Corp. v Bouley Co., 5 Misc.2d 228; Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395). On the other hand, where the language employed constitutes merely a personal covenant against assignments, an assignment made in violation of such covenant gives rise only to a claim for damages against the assignor for violation of the covenant (Sacks v Neptune Meter Co., 144 Misc. 70, 79, affd 238 App. Div. 82; Manchester v Kendall, 19 Jones Sp 460, affd 103 N.Y. 638; Empire Discount Corp. v Bouley Co., supra)."

Since the instant agreement containing the covenant against assignment is only a personal covenant of 42nd Street, a breach of said agreement only gives rise to damages based on violation of the writing.

As to the fourth cause of action, there is no evidence which demonstrates that Condren improperly and without reasonable justification interfered with the contract between plaintiff and 42nd Street to give rise to a cause of action for tortious interference with contractual relations, and thus said cause of action was properly dismissed. (Stratford Materials Corp. v Jones, 118 A.D.2d 559.)

Concur — Milonas, J.P., Ellerin, Wallach, Kassal and Smith, JJ.

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MACKLOWE v. 42ND STREET DEVELOPMENT CORP
(Feb 26, 1991)