Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the preliminary injunction is vacated, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
In November 1986 the defendant City of New York acquired a deed to the subject premises known as Lot 26, Block 2159, Section 9 in Richmond County, pursuant to a judgment entered in an in rem tax foreclosure action. The plaintiff, who owned the adjoining lot, brought this action asserting that he was the true owner of the subject premises, having acquired title by adverse possession. The plaintiff contends that he was denied due process because he did not receive personal notice of the pending foreclosure proceeding.
The motion by the City of New York for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was improperly denied, and the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was improperly granted. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the plaintiff was not provided adequate notice of the underlying foreclosure action in compliance with the Administrative Code of the City of New York §§ 11-406, 11-416 and 11-417 (see, Matter of Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d 220, affd 71 N.Y.2d 863). There is no constitutional requirement of personal notice to a party whose interest in the property is not readily ascertainable from the real property and tax records (see, Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar v County of Sullivan, 59 N.Y.2d 418). Bracken, J.P., Eiber, Balletta and Ritter, JJ., concur.