The defendant and his accomplices were apprehended on the street by police officers minutes after robbing several people in an apartment. Two of the victims were brought to the scene of the arrest, where they positively identified the defendant. These two victims were then brought to the precinct, where they again identified defendant. Other victims made their own way to the precinct and spontaneously recognized defendant, whose arrest was being processed.
The initial on-the-scene identifications were clear and unequivocal, and the victims, upon seeing defendant in the precinct, spontaneously identified him again. In this context, the identifications at the precinct were merely confirmatory (see, People v Jiminez, 157 A.D.2d 575), and need not be suppressed under the general rule barring precinct show-up identifications. (See generally, People v Lorick, 142 A.D.2d 501; People v Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523.) As to other victims who arrived unescorted at the precinct, their identifications were not the result of a police arranged procedure (compare, People v Riley, supra; compare, People v Diaz, 155 A.D.2d 612; compare also, People v Smalls, 112 A.D.2d 173).
The People concede that defendant was illegally sentenced as a second violent felony offender, since the predicate conviction, manslaughter in the second degree, is not classed as a violent felony offense (see, Penal Law § 70.02; § 70.04 [1] [b] [i]). Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing of defendant as a second felony offender.
Concur — Carro, J.P., Rosenberger, Ellerin, Kassal and Rubin, JJ.